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ABSTRACT—This Article investigates the relationship between the 
exclusive rights of patents, their information disclosures, and the impact they 
have on the development of future technologies. An examination of over 
1000 patents that courts have held valid or invalid reveals a significant 
positive relationship. Specifically, the private rights and technological 
impact of patents rise and fall together, and moreover, both are related to the 
quantity of new and useful technical information contained in their 
disclosures. 
This Article identifies, for the first time, significant differences between 
the technological impact of valid patents and invalid patents, as measured by 
the future patented inventions that relate to the original patent. Additionally, 
significant differences are also observed based on the reason for a patent’s 
invalidity, with failure to disclose novel technical information corresponding 
to the weakest future impact. These differences are traced back to 
quantifiable variations in the information content of valid patents relative to 
patents invalidated for lack of novelty, obviousness, or indefiniteness. 
Finally, the analysis completes the circuit by linking the breadth of a patent’s 
exclusive claims, when validly supported by its disclosure, to the impact that 
patent has on future technological progress. Taken together, this study finds 
that the greater the information content of a patent’s disclosure, the higher 
the probability it will be held valid, and in turn, the larger its expected 
positive impact on the development of future technologies. 
This study contributes to patent and cumulative innovation scholarship 
by investigating how the information disclosure of patents relates both to the 
private value of their exclusive rights and to the technological progress they 
promote. Furthermore, this study uncovers significant differences between 
valid and invalid patents. Moreover, unique metrics are offered for directly 
 
 † For data visualization tools that allow for additional exploration of the data used in the Article, visit 
the following link: https://nulr.shinyapps.io/patents. For interactive appendix material for this Article, 
visit the following link: https://nuitrcs.github.io/ashtor_patents_appendix. Materials are permanently 
archived at https://doi.org/10.21985/N2KJ22. 
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analyzing the information content of any patent, providing tools for future 
research. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Patents have a constitutional mandate to promote technological 
progress,1 but there is unresolved debate over whether and how they achieve 
this purpose.2 According to foundational patent theory, patents represent a 
“tradeoff” between the benefits to society of public disclosure of new 
technical information in a patent’s specification versus the burdens of private 
exclusivity over that which is disclosed.3 This study aims to test this 
relationship empirically and determine whether patent rights over technical 
information benefit or impede future technological progress. 
This study finds that valid patents actively promote follow-on 
innovation during their terms of exclusivity. By analyzing over 1500 patents 
whose validity has been determined by U.S. courts, valid patents are 
observed to give rise to more future related inventions during their lifetimes 
than invalid patents. Moreover, this effect is directly related to the extent of 
technical information disclosed in and claimed by the patents. Patents with a 
greater quantity of information content are more likely to secure valid 
exclusive rights to their owners. In turn, these patents contribute to the 
development of more future inventions by other inventors. By contrast, 
invalid patents tend to have weaker information disclosures and give rise to 
fewer future inventions. Finally, contrary to “tradeoff” theory, the breadth of 
 
 1 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (“To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for 
limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and 
Discoveries.”). 
 2 See generally Colleen V. Chien, Contextualizing Patent Disclosure, 69 VAND. L. REV. 1849 (2016) 
(discussing how not only content, but also context, is necessary in patent disclosure to achieve 
technological progress); Jeanne C. Fromer, Patent Disclosure, 94 IOWA L. REV. 539 (2009) (discussing 
the importance of patent disclosure and arguing why it is underperforming); François Lévêque & Yann 
Ménière, Patents and Innovation: Friends or Foes? (Dec. 2006) (working paper with CERNA, Centre 
d’économie industrielle Ecole Nationale Supérieure des Mines de Paris), 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=958830 [https://perma.cc/VZ6N-5J6U] (discussing whether and how patents 
impact and stimulate innovation). 
 3 See, e.g., David W. Barnes, The Incentives/Access Tradeoff, 9 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 96, 
96–98 (2010) (discussing tradeoff theory); see also Eric Budish et al., Do Firms Underinvest in Long-
Term Research? Evidence from Cancer Clinical Trials, 105 AM. ECON. REV. 2044, 2045–46 (2015). 
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a valid patent’s claims—that is, the scope of exclusivity accorded the patent 
holder—is found to be positively correlated with the development of future 
technologies. 
To conduct this analysis, data is collected on a large set of patents that 
have either been invalidated by U.S. federal district courts for failure to 
disclose novel,4 nonobvious,5 or sufficiently defined6 technical information 
or that have survived scrutiny under these criteria. The technological impact 
of each of these patents, as measured by the number of future patented 
inventions that reference them (also known as “forward citations”) over their 
lifetimes,7 is evaluated while controlling for other relevant factors such as 
patent age, technology class, and intrinsic characteristics. Forward citations 
are a widely recognized measure of cumulative innovation for patented 
inventions, as they provide a quantitative value that represents the number 
of future inventions that were derived from, or otherwise are technologically 
related to, the cited patent.8 
This analysis finds a strong positive relationship between validity and 
forward citations. Extensive statistical tests are conducted to control for 
potential sources of bias, such as selection effects, variations among patents, 
and potential endogenous interaction between case outcomes and citations. 
Furthermore, for independent verification, these results are reproduced with 
a nonoverlapping dataset of different patents held valid or invalid by the 
Federal Circuit over a different time period. 
Next, this relationship between patent validity and forward citations is 
investigated by analyzing the information content of each of the patents in 
the dataset. Both validity and technological impact (forward citations) are 
found to be positively related to information content. Using the statutory 
criteria for patent validity as a proxy for information content, as further 
 
 4 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2012) (novelty requirement). 
 5 Id. § 103 (nonobviousness requirement). 
 6 Id. § 112 (definiteness requirement). 
 7 Lifetime forward citations are used herein to observe the impact of certain patents on cumulative 
innovation from issuance. This differs from studies that measure citations in a specified time period to 
observe the impact of certain events during a patent’s life on subsequent cumulative innovation relating 
to that patent. See, e.g., infra Section I.D. 
 8 See Alberto Galasso & Mark Schankerman, Patents and Cumulative Innovation: Causal Evidence 
from the Courts, 130 Q.J. ECON. 317, 329 (2015); Zvi Griliches, Patent Statistics as Economic Indicators: 
A Survey, 28 J. ECON. LITERATURE 1661, 1668–90 (1990) (surveying forward citations and other 
quantitative patent metrics); Bronwyn H. Hall et al., Market Value and Patent Citations, 36 RAND J. 
ECON. 16, 16–17 (2005); David S. Abrams et al., Patent Value and Citations: Creative Destruction or 
Strategic Disruption? 1–4 (Penn Inst. of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 13-065, 2013), 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2351809 [https://perma.cc/CYF9-MJW4]; Ufuk Akcigit et al., The Mechanics 
of Endogenous Innovation and Growth: Evidence from Historical U.S. Patents 2–5 (Nov. 2013) 
(unpublished manuscript), http://siepr.stanford.edu/system/files/kerr.pdf [https://perma.cc/3UKA-
KTZK]. 
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explained below,9 patents lacking novelty are found to have the weakest 
impact on future technologies. Next, unique metrics are constructed to 
analyze patent information content directly, introducing several new 
variables to capture the age, scope, and quality of the patent’s disclosure. 
This reveals that the technological impact of a patent rises and falls with the 
information content of its disclosure. 
Finally, to connect the dots between patent exclusivity, information 
disclosure, and cumulative innovation, the relationship between the breadth 
of a valid patent’s claims (i.e., the strength of its exclusivity rights) and the 
impact it has on future technological development is analyzed. This reveals 
that valid patents with broader claims give rise to more future inventions than 
those with narrower claims. 
Taken together, these results indicate that patent validity, breadth of 
exclusivity, and future technological impact all move together. Information 
disclosure lies at the heart of each of these phenomena.10 
These results speak directly to the central tenet of the “tradeoff” theory 
of patents. When the disclosure function of patents is working properly, 
patents tend to promote future technological progress notwithstanding their 
exclusive rights. The discussion below draws upon modern economic growth 
literature to identify the processes by which patents promote technological 
progress, and it shows how the disclosure function of patents aligns the 
private value of exclusivity with the public benefits of future progress.11 
This paper is organized as follows. Part I addresses patent tradeoff 
theory and reviews previous empirical studies of the effects of patents on 
cumulative innovation. Part II details experimental design and methodology. 
Part III presents first-order results, robustness checks, and independent 
verification procedure. Finally, Part IV dives deeper into the data to 
investigate the relationship between information content and technological 
impact. This Article concludes by discussing the implications of the findings 
and posing questions for future research. 
I. PATENT DISCLOSURE THEORY AND RECENT EMPIRICAL STUDIES 
This Part discusses relevant theory and prior empirical studies that 
guide the analysis herein. First, foundational patent “tradeoff” theory is 
discussed in order to understand the tension between patent disclosure and 
 
 9 See infra Section IV.A. 
 10 This study does not perform a causal analysis, and therefore, it does not make conclusive 
statements as to possible causality in the relationships observed. For example, this study is not claiming 
that additional information disclosure causes a patent to receive more forward citations; rather, it simply 
relates the extent of information disclosure with the number of future citations received. 
 11 See infra Section I.C. 
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exclusivity, which sets the stage for evaluating the downstream impact on 
cumulative innovation. Against this backdrop, New Growth Theory provides 
an alternative framework that reconciles patent exclusivity with future 
technological progress. Theories of patent disclosure and applicant 
incentives are also discussed. 
Next, empirical scholarship of cumulative innovation, using measures 
based on both patents and non-patented scientific publications, are surveyed. 
These studies investigate the foregrounded theoretical principles, in 
particular focusing on whether patents impede future scientific research in a 
variety of fields. 
Finally, scholarship focusing on the relationship between patent 
validity and patented cumulative innovation is addressed. Although previous 
work has evaluated whether the event of a patent’s invalidation has an effect 
on subsequent innovation in the relevant market, no prior study has 
investigated how and why the lifetime cumulative innovation based on a 
patent varies based on the validity or invalidity of that patent, which is the 
focus of the present inquiry. 
A. “Tradeoff” Theory of Patent Disclosure 
Patent “tradeoff” theory was formalized in the late 1960s as an 
economic model for integrating the process of technological invention into 
conventional economic analysis.12 The older neoclassical tradition had 
viewed technological change as an exogenous or external shock to the 
economy. Like an unanticipated stroke of genius, invention was thought to 
occur serendipitously by way of brilliant inventors who were oblivious to 
economic incentives.13 In his famous 1969 article An Economic Theory of 
Technological Change,14 Nobel Laureate William Nordhaus intervenes in 
economics growth literature and explains the functioning of patents in the 
process of technological development. Professor Nordhaus takes as a starting 
point the notion that invention is an economically rational process 
undertaken by actors—individual inventors and companies—who respond to 
incentives provided by the broader economy.15 As such, people will invest 
 
 12 See William D. Nordhaus, An Economic Theory of Technological Change, 59 AM. ECON. REV. 18, 
18–19 (1969). 
 13 The “Schumpeter tradition” in economics of technological change treats invention as a disruptive 
process by which new technologies and processes overturn old ones. See id. at 18. 
 14 Id. 
 15 Nordhaus cites to Schumpeter, Arrow, Schmookler, and others who had introduced the idea “of 
invention as an exogenous force acting on the economic system,” rather than an endogenous activity 
arising from within the system itself. Id. For further discussion on the “exogenous force” perspective of 
the cited pieces, see generally JACOB SCHMOOKLER, INVENTION AND ECONOMIC GROWTH (1966); 
JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM AND DEMOCRACY (1942), and Kenneth J. Arrow, 
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resources in researching and developing new inventions if and to the extent 
that their expected returns justify the investment.16 Professor Nordhaus’s key 
contribution is the idea that patent laws are the mechanism by which society 
offers these returns, in the form of “temporary little monopolies on 
information.”17 
Professor Nordhaus argues that some form of monopoly over technical 
information is required to provide sufficient incentives to invest in R&D.18 
This argument draws upon an ancient principle of intellectual property 
theory. As Thomas Jefferson wrote, ideas are “like fire, expansible over all 
space, without lessening their density in any point.”19 In economic lingo, 
information and ideas are “public goods,”20 which, unlike tangible goods that 
have a finite number of physical embodiments, are “non-rival”—they are 
transmittable and reproducible at zero marginal cost.21 And in the absence of 
intellectual property protection, they are “non-excludable,” because it is 
impossible to prevent others from using an idea once it has been disclosed.22 
Yet Professor Nordhaus recognizes that patents do not provide 
permanent or very powerful exclusive rights over information. Patents only 
confer “temporary little monopolies,”23 meaning that the information therein 
may be accessed by other inventors. During the patent term, the invention 
may be licensed or acquired from the patent owner at negotiated rates.24 After 
the patent expires, the technical disclosure is freely available for use by other 
inventors.25 Thus, by either process, inventions can function as inputs into 
the development of future inventions. 
 
Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for Invention, in NAT’L BUREAU OF ECON. RESEARCH, 
THE RATE AND DIRECTION OF INVENTIVE ACTIVITY: ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL FACTORS 609–25 (1962). 
 16 Nordhaus, supra note 12, at 18 (“[O]ver half patented inventions are assigned to profit-oriented 
corporations . . . .”); id. at 19 (“[I]nventors get profits from inventions . . . .”). 
 17 Id. at 19. 
 18 Id. (“It should be stressed that the monopoly over information is essential for a sensible treatment 
of invention when invention is a public good.”). 
 19 Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Isaac McPherson (Aug. 13, 1813), in 13 THE WRITINGS OF 
THOMAS JEFFERSON 334 (Albert Ellery Berg ed., 1907). 
 20 See, e.g., Barnes, supra note 3, at 97–99 (discussing public goods). 
 21 Id. at 98–99. 
 22 See id.; Arrow, supra note 15, at 615; see also Oren Bar-Gill & Gideon Parchomovsky, Intellectual 
Property Law and the Boundaries of the Firm (Harv. Law Sch., John M. Olin Center for Law, Econ., and 
Bus., Discussion Paper No. 480, 2004; Univ. of Pa. Law Sch., Inst. for Law and Econ., Research Paper 
No. 04-19, 2004), http://ssrn.com/abstract=559195 [https://perma.cc/3RRB-TG2P] (discussing Arrow’s 
disclosure paradox). 
 23 Nordhaus, supra note 12, at 19 (“In sum, the model used here is a traditional neoclassical model 
except for the introduction of a multitude of temporary little monopolies on information.”). 
 24 See id. 
 25 Id. (“In the model we assume that the inventor has exclusive rights to use and/or license the 
invention for T years, after which the invention enters the public domain as public knowledge.”). 
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Professor Nordhaus thereby completes the circuit of invention as an 
endogenous factor in economic growth. Inventors are economic actors who 
have incentives to develop new inventions, and they have, albeit limited and 
sometimes delayed, access to existing inventions from which to create new 
ones. This gives rise to the famous “patent tradeoff.”26 According to 
Professor Nordhaus, the incentives of patent owners are in tension with the 
public interest in having access to and using new inventions. These 
competing forces must therefore be balanced, principally by calibrating the 
length of the patent term, to achieve socially optimal incentives to engage in 
R&D activity.27 
B. New Growth Theory of Patent Disclosure 
Professor Nordhaus’s tradeoff theory describes a tug-of-war between 
private and public interests concerning patents. However, economists have 
since refined their theoretical models for technological innovation and 
growth. In the early 1990s, Professor Paul Romer revolutionized economic 
growth theory with a new model of endogenous technological change.28 A 
key feature of Professor Romer’s “New Growth Theory” is that technical 
information functions as both exclusive private property and usable public 
knowledge simultaneously.29 
Professor Romer argues that patented information is “nonrival” in both 
its direct use (practicing the invention described in a patent) and in its indirect 
productive use (inspiring future inventions).30 However, only the direct use 
is exclusively restricted by patent rights. Crucially, by contrast, patented 
information remains publicly available for productive use during the patent 
term.31 Thus, the knowledge stock of the economy is only “partially 
excludable” by patents. And contrary to “tradeoff” theory, patents facilitate 
 
 26 See, e.g., Robert P. Merges & Richard R. Nelson, On the Complex Economics of Patent Scope, 
90 COLUM. L. REV. 839, 868 (1990) (“In most analyses of the different aspects of the patent system, 
concern has centered on a simple tradeoff.”). 
 27 Id. (“Nordhaus’s analysis of optimum patent life is concerned with the tradeoff between increased 
inventive effort resulting from longer anticipated patent life and greater deadweight costs associated with 
longer monopoly.”); see also F.M. Scherer, Nordhaus’ Theory of Optimal Patent Life: A Geometric 
Reinterpretation, 62 AM. ECON. REV. 422, 422–27 (1972) (interpreting Nordhaus’s economic formulas 
geometrically); William D. Nordhaus, The Optimum Life of a Patent: Reply, 62 AM. ECON. REV. 428, 
428–31 (1972) (responding to Scherer’s geometric interpretation). 
 28 Paul M. Romer, Endogenous Technological Change, 98 J. POL. ECON. S71 (1990). 
 29 Id. (“The distinguishing feature of the technology as an input is that it is neither a conventional 
good nor a public good; it is a nonrival, partially excludable good.”). 
 30 Id. at S75 (“[T]reating knowledge as a nonrival good makes it possible to talk sensibly about 
knowledge spillovers, that is, incomplete excludability.”). 
 31 Id. at S79 (“The model used here separates the rival component of knowledge, H, from the 
nonrival, technological component, A.”). 
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the public disclosure of new technical information that is immediately 
available as an input for subsequent innovation.32 
But the benefits of patent disclosure are not guaranteed. Writing around 
the same time as Professor Romer, Professor Suzanne Scotchmer theorized 
the incentives and coordination structures of patent owners and their 
competitors with respect to information disclosure.33 Professor Scotchmer 
reasoned that inventors may be discouraged from disclosing their inventions 
in a patent application when competitors can use that information to develop 
successor technologies.34 By contrast, when the scope of exclusivity is too 
broad relative to the information disclosed in a patent, it may extend to 
follow-on inventions and discourage subsequent research.35 The risk is 
particularly high in the context of cumulative research and innovation, where 
new technologies are dependent on previous advances.36 
Thus, the justification for patents centers on the relationship between 
disclosure and exclusivity. As Professor Jeanne Fromer writes, “patent 
disclosure indirectly stimulates future innovation by revealing the 
invention’s design so that others can use it fruitfully when the patent term 
expires and design around, improve upon, or be inspired by the invention, 
even during the patent term.”37 However, there is a corollary risk that 
ineffective disclosure, whether by virtue of strategic withholding by patent 
 
 32 Id. at S85 (“In an overall sense . . . nonrival design inputs are partially excludable.”). 
 33 Suzanne Scotchmer, Standing on the Shoulders of Giants: Cumulative Research and the Patent 
Law, 5 J. ECON. PERSP. 29 (1991); see also Suzanne Scotchmer & Jerry Green, Novelty and Disclosure 
in Patent Law, 21 RAND J. ECON. 131 (1990) (analyzing how applicants have incentives to limit 
disclosure in patents and the implications on patenting and innovation). 
 34 Scotchmer, supra note 33, at 39 (“Patent law requires disclosure for the same reason that 
innovators dislike it: it is the vehicle by which technical knowledge is passed from the patenting firm to 
its competitors.”). 
 35 Id. at 30 (“If broad protection is granted, then a derivative or second generation product will likely 
infringe the prior patent, so a license on the original patent is required to market it.”); id. at 38 (“Before 
investing in a second generation technology, the researcher must evaluate the probability that the new 
technology will not infringe the prior patent. This probability depends on the breadth of the prior patent 
and on the distribution of possible outcomes of the second investment.”). 
 36 Id. at 29 (“Most innovators stand on the shoulders of giants, and never more so than in the current 
evolution of high technologies, where almost all technical progress builds on a foundation provided by 
earlier innovators.”); see also James E. Bessen, From Knowledge to Ideas: The Two Faces of Innovation 
29 (Boston Univ. Sch. of Law, Working Paper No. 10-35, 2011), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1698802 [https://perma.cc/NQB9-KAAT] (“[T]o 
the extent that firms practicing the old technology have patents that read on the new technology, patents 
can serve to block entry to some degree.”). See generally Akcigit et al., supra note 8 (discussing 
cumulative innovation and patents). 
 37 Fromer, supra note 2, at 541 (emphasis added). 
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applicants or overly broad rights upon patent issuance, may grant too much 
power to the patent holder and impede future development.38 
The foregoing theoretical principles have been investigated and tested 
in a number of sophisticated empirical studies, which serve as precedents for 
the present inquiry. In particular, the following Section addresses empirical 
studies of cumulative innovation, studies focusing on patent invalidation and 
the impact that has on cumulative innovation in the relevant technology 
markets, and lessons to be learned from this scholarship that will guide the 
analysis below. 
C. Empirical Studies of Cumulative Innovation 
Several empirical studies have analyzed whether the private exclusivity 
conferred by patents, in practice if not in principle, impedes subsequent 
utilization of the information disclosed thereby. Their methodologies and 
findings guide the present inquiry by providing an empirical framework for 
analyzing cumulative innovation as it relates to patent rights. 
One of the earliest empirical studies in this vein seeks to measure the 
“anti-commons effect”39 of a patent grant over published scientific 
knowledge.40 Addressing an issue that is particularly relevant in the 
biotechnology field, Professors Fiona Murray and Scott Stern ask whether 
patents lead to the “privatization” of scientific knowledge, removing it from 
the public domain and stifling subsequent noncommercial research.41 
Focusing on 340 peer-reviewed scientific articles published between 1997 
and 1999 in the periodical Nature Biotechnology,42 they use a difference-in-
difference specification43 to measure the extent to which the number of 
 
 38 Id. at 551 (“Without successful disclosure, the same inventor will be more likely to continue 
building up on his original invention because he will be the one with the best information to do so. In 
fact, inventors appear to innovate based only on the information they already have when other information 
is difficult to acquire. Ineffective disclosure, by extension, can also prolong the patent right beyond its 
stated expiration because more of the useful information about an invention remains only in the patentee’s 
hands.”). 
 39 The “anti-commons effect” is a term used to connote negative effects of widespread private 
ownership and wealth that reduces public resources. 
 40 Fiona Murray & Scott Stern, Do Formal Intellectual Property Rights Hinder the Free Flow of 
Scientific Knowledge? An Empirical Test of the Anti-Commons Hypothesis, 63 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 
648 (2007). 
 41 Id. at 649, 654. 
 42 Id. at 651. 
 43 A difference-in-difference specification is a regression procedure that analyzes the causal effect 
of an event on a sample of a population. Generally speaking, it compares the difference between the 
affected sample and unaffected sample of the population before versus after the event in question. 
Difference in Differences, WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Difference_in_differences [https:// 
perma.cc/KQD2-RHBK]. 
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subsequent scientific publications to these articles changes following 
issuance of a complementary patent covering the published information.44 
Exploiting the fact that half of their sample involved complementary 
paper–patent pairs45 and the patents issued on average more than three years 
following initial publication of the corresponding paper,46 Professors Murray 
and Stern measure the change in future publications conditional on the patent 
grant, and they find a statistically significant but “modest” decline.47 
Accordingly, they conclude that there is some evidence of an “anti-
commons” effect on future scientific research.48 However, the authors do not 
study the effects of patenting on future patented technological development, 
which is the focus of the present study. Additionally, in absolute numbers, 
they find that the articles that were originally complemented by a patent gave 
rise to more future scientific publications than the unpatented set, despite the 
observed post-grant decline, which arguably suggests that papers with 
patents do more to promote future technological progress than papers 
without patent complements.49 
In 2013, Professor Heidi Williams conducted another study of the 
perceived anti-commons effect of patents on future scientific research in the 
biotechnology field.50 Focusing on the industry-wide effort to sequence the 
human genome in the 1990s,51 Professor Williams compares subsequent 
scientific publications and diagnostic tests based on public domain genes, 
which were disclosed for public use as part of the Human Genome Project,52 
to publications and tests based on genes first sequenced by a private firm, 
which charged access fees for use.53 Professor Williams found that the genes 
 
 44 Murray & Stern, supra note 40, at 650. 
 45 Id. at 651. 
 46 Id. (“For those articles that ultimately receive a patent, there is a significant lag between scientific 
publication and patent grant (on average, more than 3 years).”). 
 47 Id. (“[T]hough the size of the effect is modest, the approach and results do seem to provide 
empirical evidence consistent with the anti-commons effect.”). 
 48 Id. at 673. 
 49 Id. at 651 (“[P]ublished articles also associated with formal IP are more highly cited than those 
whose authors choose not to file for patents; however, most of this boost is accounted for by observed 
characteristics such as author location and number of authors on the article.”). 
 50 Heidi L. Williams, Intellectual Property Rights and Innovation: Evidence from the Human 
Genome, 121 J. POL. ECON. 1 (2013). 
 51 Id. at 2. 
 52 Id. at 10. 
 53 Id. at 2. Notably, the firm did not charge for research access. Id. at 11 (“Academic researchers 
were free to use Celera’s data for noncommercial research and academic publications.”). 
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commercialized by the private firm were cited in scientific publications less 
frequently than those first published by the public effort.54 
Notably, however, given that the public race to sequence the entire 
genome prioritized the sequencing of the most valuable genes, the genes first 
sequenced by the private firm were considerably less valuable than those of 
the Human Genome Project.55 Also, it was well-known in the industry that 
the Project would complete sequencing of the entire genome by 2003, at 
which point all genes would be publicly available,56 which in turn influenced 
selection and outcomes. Finally, Professor Williams’s study does not address 
patents—the private firm used contractual arrangements to capture value 
from its genes prior to public sequencing, and the variable includes scientific 
research publications and developed diagnostic tests but not patents.57 
Accordingly, Professor Williams’s study, like Professors Murray and 
Stern’s, does not directly address cumulative innovation of patented 
technologies, which is the focus of the present inquiry. 
In 2015, Professors Bhaven Sampat and Williams conducted a study 
focusing specifically on the effect of gene patents on future scientific 
research and clinical trials.58 Addressing concerns over cumulative 
innovation in biotechnology,59 including the Supreme Court’s invalidation of 
certain gene patent claims on the basis that they “would ‘tie up’ . . . such 
tools and . . . inhibit future innovation,”60 Professors Sampat and Williams 
analyze the impact of the issuance of a patent on the number of subsequent 
research publications and clinical drug trials related to the patented gene.61 
To do so, they identify approximately 1500 patent applications filed between 
2000 and 2005 that claim human gene sequences,62 and they compare the 
 
 54 Id. at 3 (“Celera genes had an average of 1.2 publications by 2009, relative to 2.1 publications for 
non-Celera genes sequenced in the same year.”). 
 55 Id. at 12 (“[G]enes initially sequenced by the public effort had higher ex ante expected value than 
genes initially sequenced by Celera.”). 
 56 Id. at 11 (“[I]t was publicly known in 2001 that all of Celera’s genes would be resequenced by the 
public effort, and thus move into the public domain, by 2003.”). 
 57 Id. at 2–3. 
 58 Bhaven Sampat & Heidi L. Williams, How Do Patents Affect Follow-On Innovation? Evidence 
from the Human Genome (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 21666, 2018), 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2679705 [https://perma.cc/AQ2Y-SX45]. 
 59 Id. at 1 (“Our broad goal is to inform whether the Nordhaus-style trade-off between ex ante 
incentives and deadweight loss is sufficient for optimal patent policy design, or whether—at least in this 
context—the effects of patents on follow-on innovation need to be considered.”). 
 60 Id. at 29 (quoting Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 569 U.S. 576, 589 
(2013)) (emphasis omitted). 
 61 Id. at 2 (“Specifically, we measure the scientific publications related to each gene as an indicator 
of scientific research investments, and measure the use of genes in pharmaceutical clinical trials and 
diagnostic tests as indicators of commercial research investments.”). 
 62 Id. at 39. 
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number of future publications and clinical trials based on genes on which the 
patents issued versus applications that were rejected.63 Also, to control for 
inherent quality factors that may produce a correlation between the outcome 
of an application and downstream impact, irrespective of patent rights, they 
use the historic leniency of each United States Patent and Trademark Office 
(USPTO) examiner as an instrument for observing future impact conditioned 
solely on whether patent rights were granted.64 
Their results are particularly relevant to the present study in the 
following ways. Despite concerns that patents may impede cumulative 
development,65 Professors Sampat and Williams find no statistical difference 
between the future scientific research publications and clinical development 
relating to patented genes compared to genes that remained in the public 
domain.66 As with the previous studies, they do not observe the effects of 
patents on future patented technologies, relying only on evidence from 
publications and clinical development. 
Each of the foregoing studies provides relevant results speaking to the 
impact of patents on future scientific research and development, as well as 
useful methodological guidance. However, these studies do not speak to the 
impact of patents on future patented technological progress. By contrast, the 
study discussed in the next Section addresses cumulative patented innovation 
as a function of patent invalidation. 
D. Empirical Studies of Patent Validity and Cumulative Innovation 
Patent law provides a convenient lens through which to observe the 
impact of a patent upon future technology. When applying for a patent, 
inventors have a duty to disclose prior patents of which they are aware that 
relate to the claimed invention.67 Additionally, the USPTO examiner 
searches for relevant prior patents each time she reviews a new application, 
and the patent that issues makes reference to the results.68 By tallying the 
 
 63 Id. at 8–9. 
 64 Id. at 3. 
 65 Id. at 4. 
 66 Id. at 3 (“In contrast with what one would infer from a naïve comparison of follow-on innovation 
on patented and non-patented genes, both of our quasi-experimental approaches suggest that gene patents 
have not had quantitatively important effects on either follow-on scientific research or follow-on 
commercial investments.”). 
 67 37 C.F.R. § 1.56 (2018) (applicant’s duty of candor to disclose information material to 
patentability). The duty to cite a relevant patent does not depend on the cited patent’s validity. See Galasso 
& Schankerman, supra note 8, at 329 (“Importantly for our purposes, the expiration or invalidation of a 
patent has no impact on its prior art status (35 U.S. Code, section 102), so the requirement to cite it 
remains in place.”). 
 68 See generally Juan Alcácer et al., Applicant and Examiner Citations in U.S. Patents: An Overview 
and Analysis, 38 RES. POL’Y 415 (2009) (discussing examiner citations). 
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number of future patents issuing from these applications that cite a given 
patent (commonly known as “forward citations”), one can study the original 
patent’s impact on future technologies. 
Forward citations are a widely used measure of the progress of patented 
technology.69 Notably, however, these citations are not a perfect measure of 
cumulative innovation, and they may lack precision in certain contexts. As 
Professors Alberto Galasso and Mark Schankerman write: “Citations can 
either under- or overestimate the extent of follow-on innovation. They will 
underestimate it where inventors develop improvements that are not patented 
(or patentable), but overestimate it when the inventor did not actually built 
on the prior patent.”70 Nonetheless, forward citations are widely used as 
aggregate measures of levels of innovation, particularly where, as here, one 
compares citations received by similarly situated patents.71 A recent study 
uses forward citations to analyze the impact of patent invalidation upon 
subsequent patented technology development across a broad range of fields, 
and this study provides a useful roadmap for the analysis herein. In their 2014 
study, Professors Galasso and Schankerman investigated the change in 
patent forward citations received by 1258 patents the Federal Circuit had 
invalidated or upheld.72 Specifically, they measured whether invalidation 
causes an increase or decrease in post-adjudication citations to the patent, 
controlling for technology value73 and other factors.74 In their first-order 
regression model (without controlling for possible endogeneity, as described 
below), they find no difference in the absolute number of citations received 
by invalidated versus upheld patents.75 
However, in order to identify the true effect of invalidation, they must 
overcome endogeneity in their dataset. Endogeneity in regression analysis 
can be thought of as a circular relationship between the dependent and 
 
 69 Abrams et al., supra note 8, at 1; Akcigit et al., supra note 8, at 3 (using citations to measure 
cumulative innovation); Galasso & Schankerman, supra note 8, at 329 (“We use the number of citations 
by subsequent patents to the focal patent as a measure of cumulative innovation. . . . Citations have been 
widely used in the economics of innovation literature as a proxy for follow-on research and are the only 
practical measure of cumulative innovation for studies such as ours that cover a wide range of technology 
fields.”); Hall et al., supra note 8, at 16. 
 70 Galasso & Schankerman, supra note 8, at 357. 
 71 Id. at 354 (discussing their study design using forward citations as the primary dependent variable). 
 72 Id. at 330. 
 73 Id. at 333 (“To control for heterogeneity in the value that the patent has for the patentee and follow-
on inventors, we include the number of claims and the number of external and self citations received prior 
to the Federal Circuit decision (PreCites and PreSelfCites, respectively) as covariates in the regression.”). 
 74 Id. 
 75 Id. at 339 (“We begin in column (1) by presenting the OLS estimate of the baseline specification 
relating external citations in a five-year window after the court decision to the invalidity dummy and 
additional controls. There is no significant correlation between patent invalidation and future citations.”). 
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independent variables, which may result in significant relationships being 
observed incorrectly. For example, the possibility that an increase in the 
value of the technology during the patent’s lifetime could drive both an 
increase in future citations and extra effort by the patent owner to avoid 
invalidation.76 Accordingly, they employ what is known as an “instrument” 
to separate out the two possible effects and measure only the impact of 
invalidation on subsequent citations. Specifically, they construct an 
instrument based on the relative bias of the Federal Circuit panel hearing 
each appeal to observe the marginal unbiased effects of invalidation on 
future citations.77 
Their findings cast doubt on the notion that patents generally tend to 
impede subsequent technological innovation.78 Although they find a 
statistically significant increase in post-invalidation citations, this effect is 
driven by new patenting in a few very specific circumstances.79 In particular, 
it is “concentrated among a small subset of [invalidated] patents,”80 where 
there is new entry81 into a few specific complex82 technology markets, and 
where the invalidated patent was owned by a large firm.83 Additionally, the 
effect is concentrated on “stronger patents,” which have a lower probability 
of being held invalid—that is, patents which were invalidated 
unexpectedly.84 Arguably, this demonstrates rent-seeking behavior on the 
part of new entrants, who file new patent applications to compete for market 
share after a larger firm’s strong patent has been invalidated.85 
 
 76 Id. at 334 (“The major empirical challenge is that the decision by the Federal Circuit to invalidate 
a patent is endogenous. For example, a positive shock to the value of the underlying technology may 
increase citations to a patent and, at the same time, induce the patentee to invest heavily in the case to 
avoid invalidation.”). 
 77 Id. at 334–35. 
 78 Id. at 321 (“[W]e find that the impact of patent invalidation on subsequent innovation is highly 
heterogeneous. For most patents, the marginal treatment effect of invalidation is not statistically different 
from zero.”). 
 79 Id. at 341 (“[The] average effect is misleading because it hides the fact that the ‘blocking effect’ 
of patent rights is highly heterogeneous.”). 
 80 Id. at 348. 
 81 Id. at 345 (“The estimated time path is more compatible with a story of entry of new innovators, 
previously blocked, developing technology building on the focal patent.”). 
 82 Id. at 352 (“[T]he fragmentation of patent ownership and complexity of technology fields are key 
empirical determinants of the relationship between patent rights and cumulative innovation.”). 
 83 Id. at 354 (“[T]he blocking effect of invalidation is concentrated exclusively on citations that 
patents of large firms receive from small innovators.”). 
 84 Id. at 321. 
 85 Notably, their study does not demonstrate whether the new entry demonstrates significant 
technological advances over the prior state of the art, nor do they provide evidence that the dominant firm 
had allowed technology to stagnate prior to invalidation. Id. at 341 n.20; Alberto Galasso & Mark 
Schankerman, Patents Rights and Innovation by Small and Large Firms (Rotman Sch. of Mgmt., 
Working Paper No. 2694725, 2015) https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2694725 
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Unlike the present study, Professors Galasso and Schankerman do not 
measure the lifetime citations of the patents in their study, focusing only on 
the change in citations before and after invalidation.86 They also do not 
analyze the basis on which the patent is invalidated. As discussed below, the 
criteria for patent validity are closely related to information content, and the 
reason why a patent is invalidated may shed light on whether patent rights 
restrict or promote future development of the technical information they 
disclose. 
More generally, Professors Galasso and Schankerman focus on the 
invalidation of a patent as a useful event for studying how the loss of 
exclusivity over patented information affects future innovation. This study 
takes a different approach by treating the later-adjudicated validity or 
invalidity of a patent as an observable indicator of the inherent features of 
the patent, features which exist at the time the patent issues and which may 
impact subsequent cumulative innovation over the lifetime of the patent. 
E. Using Validity Decisions to Observe Inherent Patent Characteristics 
This study uses a court’s decision on validity as a way of identifying 
patents that possess certain otherwise unobservable characteristics and 
distinguishing them from patents that lack them. Using this filter, this study 
investigates whether these underlying characteristics result in significant 
differences in the cumulative innovation relating to these patents over their 
entire lifetimes, from issuance through the adjudication of validity and 
beyond. Then, finally, the details of the entire set of patents are mined to try 
to register these characteristics directly, and thereby explain the observed 
effects on technological progress. 
This study further posits that the criteria for patent validity provide an 
ideal lens for studying the information disclosure function of patents, which 
facilitates the analysis below.87 To be valid, a patent must disclose new and 
useful technical information pertaining to patent-eligible subject matter,88 
 
[https://perma.cc/Y7PQ-62KU] (“Patent invalidation leads to a 50 percent decrease in patenting by the 
patent holder, on average, but the impact depends critically on characteristics of the patentee and the 
competitive environment. The effect is entirely driven by small innovative firms in technology fields 
where they face many large incumbents. Invalidation of patents held by large firms does not change the 
intensity of their innovation but shifts the technological direction of their subsequent patenting.”). 
 86 Galasso & Schankerman, supra note 8, at 333. 
 87 See Scotchmer & Green, supra note 33, at 131 (“The legal requirements of ‘novelty’ and 
‘nonobviousness’ . . . determine the value of patent protection, the incentives for research, and how much 
technical information is shared among firms through patenting.”). 
 88 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2012). 
113:943 (2019) Patented Information 
959 
which is both novel89 and not obvious in light of the prior art.90 The disclosure 
must also be sufficiently clear and detailed91 to enable practitioners to make 
and use embodiments of the claimed invention.92 These statutory 
requirements test both the extent and quality of a patent’s information 
disclosure, and in turn, they provide a useful lens for this study. 
In particular, this study uses the requirements of novelty, 
nonobviousness, and the clarity and enablement of the specification as 
statutory filters for information disclosure. Novelty under § 102 requires 
“each and every element” of the patent to be present in a single prior art 
reference.93 Accordingly, novelty can serve as a filter for the newness of the 
technical information disclosed in a patent. Nonobviousness under § 103 
permits multiple prior art references to be combined, where applicable, to 
cover the elements of the invention.94 For purposes of this study, 
nonobviousness serves as a similar proxy to novelty, but one would expect a 
patent that is invalidated on the basis of novelty might contribute less to 
cumulative innovation, as all of the information therein was previously 
disclosed in the prior art. By contrast, the statutory requirements under § 112 
test the clarity of the written description,95 and they further require the patent 
applicant to provide sufficient detail to enable others to practice the 
invention.96 This can generally be thought of as testing the clarity of the 
disclosure, including whether it enables others to practice the invention. One 
might expect patents invalidated under § 112 but not under § 102 or § 103 to 
contribute more to technological progress, to the extent the information 
therein is novel and nonobvious (albeit perhaps unclear). 
 
 89 Id. § 102. 
 90 Id. § 103. “Prior art” generally refers to previously issued patents and publications according to 
the statutory requirements. 
 91 Id. § 112(a) (“The specification shall contain a written description of the invention, and of the 
manner and process of making and using it, in such full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable any 
person skilled in the art to which it pertains, or with which it is most nearly connected, to make and use 
the same, and shall set forth the best mode contemplated by the inventor or joint inventor of carrying out 
the invention.”). 
 92 Id. 
 93 Verdegaal Bros. v. Union Oil Co. of Cal., 814 F.2d 628, 631 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (“A claim is 
anticipated only if each and every element as set forth in the claim is found, either expressly or inherently 
described, in a single prior art reference.”). 
 94 KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 415–16 (2007); Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 
1, 32 (1966); DyStar Textilfarben GmbH v. C.H. Patrick Co., 464 F.3d 1356, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2006). 
 95 Ariad Pharm., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (en banc) (“We now 
reaffirm that § 112, first paragraph, contains a written description requirement separate from 
enablement . . . .”). 
 96 In re Wands, 858 F.2d 731, 737 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (“[I]t is well established that enablement requires 
that the specification teach those in the art to make and use the invention without undue 
experimentation.”). 
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Finally, I again emphasize that this study is not examining the effect of 
invalidation on cumulative innovation, but rather validity is treated as a 
property of a patent in order to examine what that indicates regarding the 
information disclosed therein. That is, if valid patents disclose more new and 
useful technical information, and if greater disclosure by a patent gives rise 
to more future invention despite the exclusivity of that patent, then the 
analysis below should observe valid patents receiving more forward citations 
than invalid patents, all else equal. 
II. EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN 
A. Empirical Challenges 
This study’s analysis faces four key challenges. First, both invalid and 
valid patents that are adjudicated in court are likely to have many more 
forward citations than the average patent.97 Litigated patents receive more 
citations, which corresponds in part to heightened competition between 
technology producers in contested markets.98 Litigated patents are also more 
likely to have higher private value to their owners,99 which is also reflected 
in high citation counts.100 Moreover, the dataset is selecting from the most 
contentious and high-stakes cases, where the parties litigated without 
settlement to the point of a judge or jury determination on validity. 
Therefore, one would expect high average citation counts for all patents in 
the dataset, irrespective of their validity.101 
Second, any difference between the forward citations of valid and 
invalid patents is likely to be quite subtle. At least two recent studies did not 
observe statistically significant differences in citation counts of valid versus 
invalid patents. In a 2014 cross-sectional study of non-practicing entity 
 
 97 See John R. Allison et al., Extreme Value or Trolls on Top? The Characteristics of the Most-
Litigated Patents, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 13–14 (2009); John R. Allison et al., Valuable Patents, 92 GEO. 
L.J. 435, 455 (2004) [hereinafter Allison et al., Valuable Patents]; see also Alan C. Marco & Saurabh 
Vishnubhakat, Certain Patents, 16 YALE J.L. & TECH. 103, 111 n.37 (2013) (citing Colleen V. Chien, 
Predicting Patent Litigation, 90 TEX. L. REV. 283, 304–06, 316–17, 320–21 (2011)) (“A higher number 
of forward citations is correlated with a greater incidence of litigation.”). 
 98 See Jean O. Lanjouw & Mark Schankerman, Characteristics of Patent Litigation: A Window on 
Competition, 32 RAND J. ECON. 129, 138 (2001) (analyzing how a high number of citations indicates an 
increased level of competition in that patent’s marketplace). 
 99 See, e.g., Allison et al., Valuable Patents, supra note 97, at 439–41; Hall et al., supra note 8, at 19; 
Lanjouw & Schankerman, supra note 98, at 137; Marco & Vishnubhakat, supra note 97, at 110–11 
(discussing the relationship between intrinsic and acquired qualities of a patent, including forward 
citations, and incidence of litigation, a proxy for patent value). 
 100 Allison et al., Valuable Patents, supra note 97, at 455; see also John R. Allison et al., Patent 
Quality and Settlement Among Repeat Patent Litigants, 99 GEO. L.J. 677, 710 (2011). 
 101 High average citation counts suggest high variability across the distribution of citations, 
potentially making it harder to observe differences between the two sets of patents. 
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(NPE) cases with matching non-NPE cases,102 Professor Michael Risch 
found no difference in forward citations across a dataset comprising 352 
NPE patents and a matching set of 791 patents, produced by sampling over 
twenty years of cases.103 However, that study was designed to identify 
distinguishing characteristics of NPE litigations, and it did not analyze a 
comprehensive sample of cases adjudicating validity. 
Professors John Allison, Mark Lemley, and David Schwartz also 
observed no significant differences in forward citations between patents 
asserted in cases filed in 2008 and 2009.104 Their dataset was both over- and 
underinclusive with respect to validity, as it contained many cases in which 
no decision on validity was rendered and also omitted many cases filed in 
other years that adjudicated validity.105 Nonetheless, these studies teach that 
any citation differences between valid and invalid patents, if they exist, are 
likely to be small. 
Third, even if a difference between citations received by valid and 
invalid patents is observed, it might have nothing to do with the information 
content of these patents. Patents may be invalidated for reasons that have 
nothing to do with the novelty or extent of the technical information they 
disclose.106 Each litigant’s efforts to secure its position may influence the 
court’s holding on validity, irrespective of the merits of the patent itself.107 
Like other studies of cumulative innovation,108 this study must address 
potential endogeneity and other factors that could confound observations. 
The analysis below employs a variety of statistical techniques and design 
strategies to test the results. 
Finally, the effect of an invalidation decision may itself influence future 
citation counts, which could have an effect on the lifetime citation counts 
that are observed. A patent that has been invalidated continues to function as 
prior art, but no longer poses an infringement risk to subsequent inventors. 
In turn, these inventors are motivated to cite invalidated patents, because 
doing so could preempt future invalidity challenges to their own patents 
without any risk that the owner of the invalid cited patents will accuse them 
of infringement.109 Additionally, as Professors Galasso and Schankerman 
 
 102 Michael Risch, A Generation of Patent Litigation, 52 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 67 (2015). 
 103 Id. at 84, 89, 117–20. 
 104 John R. Allison et al., Understanding the Realities of Modern Patent Litigation, 92 TEX. L. REV. 
1769, 1770, 1799 (2014). 
 105 Id. at 1776–77. 
 106 For example, 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2012) sets the eligibility requirements for patentable subject 
matter. 
 107 See infra Section III.C. 
 108 See Galasso & Schankerman, supra note 8; Sampat & Williams, supra note 58. 
 109 See Galasso & Schankerman, supra note 8, at 364. 
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demonstrate, new patenting is likely to occur under certain circumstances 
after invalidation of certain types of strong patents, which also increases 
forward citation counts.110 Both of these possible effects work in opposition 
to the signal being sought here, as they would tend to increase the number of 
forward citations received by invalid patents relative to valid patents. 
Accordingly, they may further obfuscate any net positive relationship 
between validity and citations that may exist. 
As discussed in Sections III.B and III.C below, these issues are 
addressed in the experimental design, analysis, and robustness tests 
employed herein. Although only litigated patents are studied, this is true of 
many studies of this type, and no claims are made about applicability of the 
findings to the full population of patents whose validity is never challenged. 
Careful testing and successive regression modeling are used to observe 
differences between the valid and invalid patents in the dataset, and a large 
sample size permits significance testing for even small observed differences 
in citation counts. The basis for invalidation is controlled for, and direct 
analysis of the information content of the patents is also conducted to 
complete the picture. Finally, several tests are conducted to check and 
control for endogeneity, including certain tests performed by Professors 
Galasso and Schankerman and others.111 Taken together, the methodology 
employed here is designed to address the concerns articulated and present 
robust results. 
B. Guiding Hypotheses 
To overcome the challenges described above, the analysis is guided by 
a series of successive hypotheses. They are as follows: 
H1: Patented technical information is available for productive use during the 
patent term. 
H2: The number of future inventions that relate to an original invention 
should increase with the extent of new technical information disclosed in the 
original patent. 
H3: The criteria for patent validity (particularly 35 U.S.C. §§ 102–103, 112) 
scrutinize the novelty and effectiveness of a patent’s information disclosure. 
H4:  Accordingly, combining H2 and H3 implies that patents that are 
invalidated may contain less productively useful information and therefore give 
rise to fewer future inventions over their lifetimes (after controlling for 
technology class, age, etc.). 
H5:  Additionally, patents with broader claims that are validly supported by 
their disclosures are likely to contain more technical information than patents 
 
 110 Id. at 321–22. 
 111 See infra Section III.C. 
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with narrower claims, given the statutory criteria above. Accordingly, the claim 
breadth of valid patents should be positively correlated with the number of 
future citations they receive. 
The dataset construction and analysis below proceed sequentially from 
these hypotheses, testing each in turn. 
C. Description of the Dataset 
The dataset used herein is compiled from a large sample of U.S. patents 
that courts have held valid or invalid. The initial dataset comprises 1056 U.S. 
federal district court patent cases published on Westlaw from 2004 through 
2011112 in which a decision on liability or infringement was rendered at trial 
or on summary judgment.113 Each decision is analyzed to determine whether 
an express finding of validity was made, excluding findings of 
noninfringement and procedural rulings where validity was not addressed.114 
The dataset is further supplemented with additional searches on 
DocketNavigator for validity rulings over the same time period, and the 
results are cross-checked with Westlaw for consistency.115 Reversals on 
appeal are controlled for to ensure that the final decision on validity is being 
used to classify the patents.116 
 
 112 The underlying dataset is licensed from PricewaterhouseCoopers and used in their annual patent 
litigation reports. See CHRIS BARRY ET AL., PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, 2015 PATENT LITIGATION 
STUDY: A CHANGE IN PATENTEE FORTUNES (2015), http://www.pwc.com/en_US/us/forensic-
services/publications/assets/2015-pwc-patent-litigation-study.pdf [https://perma.cc/VP5W-WE49]. The 
dataset contains 703 cases holding at least one of the asserted patents valid or invalid. 
 113 Cases that were dismissed on the pleadings are excluded, and only dispositive findings of patent 
validity are retained. Also, although litigation intensity is not measured directly (e.g., such as by 
measuring the number of docket entries in a given case), appeals are coded in subsequent analyses below 
as a proxy to control for litigation intensity. 
 114 Notably, validity is adjudicated for each patent claim, and a single patent may contain some 
claims that have been invalidated and some that have been held valid. This is rare, but to avoid multiple 
records of the same patent, any patents with such overlap are excluded. Also, consistent with previous 
studies, a patent is coded as invalid where any claim has been held invalid, and vice versa for valid claims. 
See Galasso & Schankerman, supra note 8, at 330 (describing their invalidated flag); see also Marco & 
Vishnubhakat, supra note 97, at 115 (“[T]he question of validity may reasonably be framed as a binary 
decision.”). Finally, design patents are excluded, as are unenforceability rulings, ownership disputes, and 
other adjudications of ancillary matters. 
 115 DocketNavigator is used as a supplement to avoid potential underreporting of decisions in 
Westlaw. Although it is impossible to ensure all validity decisions during the relevant time period are 
being captured, using DocketNavigator as a redundancy allows improvement over using Westlaw as the 
sole data source. 
 116 A small number of the cases upholding patents in the dataset did not expressly adjudicate validity 
in their final written opinions, due to summary adjudications without opinion or failure by the defendant 
to mount a meritorious claim of invalidity. Given that a defendant would challenge the validity of a patent 
where possible, the failure to do so indicates that no potentially invalidating prior art was found and 
justifies treating the patent as valid. 
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Patents are filtered to require a minimum patent age of ten years as of 
the time of study, resulting in the exclusion of patents that issued after 
2006.117 This minimum age requirement largely avoids truncation of forward 
citations. Forward citations accrue over time and are therefore highly time-
dependent,118 and citation counts in the early years of a patent’s term may be 
a small fraction of the number expected over its full term.119 Observing at 
least ten full years of citations largely circumvents the issue,120 and several 
robustness checks are also employed to ensure age differences are not 
driving results.121 This age selection also ensures that all included patents 
appear in the current NBER patent dataset,122 which facilitates comparisons 
with the full population of U.S. patents issuing in the same years and the 
derivation of several meaningful metrics. 
The resulting dataset comprises 416 valid and 502 invalid patents,123 for 
a total of 918 patents, as shown below.124 
 
 117 Given the time period of cases, all of which were concluded before 2012, only a small number of 
patents issued post-2006 were dropped. A small number of very old patents (pre-4,000,000 series) are 
also excluded. 
 118 See Bronwyn H. Hall et al., The NBER Patent Citations Data File: Lessons, Insights and 
Methodological Tools 15–16 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 8498, 2001), 
http://www.nber.org/papers/w8498.pdf [https://perma.cc/RA5H-QJUD] (measuring citations of the 
population of issued patents and constructing metrics of generality and originality therefrom). 
 119 Id.; see also Alan C. Marco, The Dynamics of Patent Citations, 94 ECON. LETTERS 290, 291 
(2007) (“Younger patents are bound to have fewer citations than otherwise identical older patents; that 
is, the distribution of forward citations is truncated . . . .”). 
 120 Although there are statistical adjustments to compensate for truncation in certain applications, the 
actual number of citations received must be observed in order to analyze true technological impact. 
Contra Allison et al., supra note 104, at 1769 n.26 (not observing a difference between citations received 
by valid versus invalid patents when using a statistical adjustment procedure to compensate for 
truncation). 
 121 See infra Section III.B. 
 122 Patent Data Project, NAT’L BUREAU OF ECON. RES., 
https://sites.google.com/site/patentdataproject [https://perma.cc/8UYV-C723] (publishing forward 
citation data and generating several useful metrics of a large population of U.S. patents issued until 2006). 
 123 Note that cases where the parties settled after a ruling on validity or invalidity may be 
underrepresented if the ruling was not published in Westlaw and retrieved by these searches. Also, it 
should be noted that valid patents are typically more difficult to identify in Westlaw than invalid patents, 
which are marked by a red flag. Also, cases awarding liability for infringement may hold the underlying 
patents valid during preliminary rulings prior to trial, and in some cases invalidity defenses may be 
quickly dismissed, or not raised at all, if the accused infringer fails to find sufficient evidence of invalidity. 
Explicit findings of validity are sought for each valid patent in the dataset, whether in the final opinion or 
in preliminary rulings or dismissals of counterclaims, including cases where validity was not adjudicated 
at trial (e.g., pretrial or in judgment as a matter of law (JMOL) rulings) and cases where the patents were 
held valid and non-infringed. In any event, restricting the dataset to only patents that were explicitly held 
valid in published opinions (excluding unpublished pretrial rulings and jury verdicts) should not alter 
results given that most decisions involving material issues in dispute generally result in an opinion. 
 124 Another 616 different patents held valid or invalid by the Federal Circuit are also analyzed in 
Section III.D below, for a total of 1534 patents. 
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TABLE 1 
 Valid Invalid 
Number 416 502 
Percent of Total 45.3% 54.7% 
 
Three sets of variables are coded describing these patents, the cases 
adjudicating them, and the forward citations they received. Case variables 
include the decision date, court, basis for invalidity (if held invalid), and 
whether the case was appealed. Patent variables include various intrinsic 
attributes of the patents,125 such as the number of independent and dependent 
claims, filing and issue dates, number of inventors, citations made to 
previous patents (“backward citations”), and assignee information. The 
technology class is also identified and coded using the six main categories 
and thirty-six subcategories employed by Professors Bronwyn Hall, Adam 
Jaffe, and Manuel Trajtenberg.126 These categories were developed based on 
the U.S. Patent Classifications (USPC) assigned to each patent by the 
USPTO, and each subcategory aggregates several USPCs together based on 
technology types.127 Then, the full document of each patent is retrieved from 
Google Patents, from which additional details, such as textual characteristics 
of the claims and written description, number of figures, backward citations 
to non-patent literature, and identities and nationalities of the inventors, are 
coded. Several acquired attributes, including assignments and liens recorded 
against the patent, are also coded. 
Next, a custom script is used to identify and retrieve all subsequent U.S. 
patents issued before January 2016 that cite each patent in the dataset. Details 
of these forward citations are coded, principally including the intrinsic 
attributes identified above, when the citation was made during the term of 
the cited patent, whether the citation was made by the USPTO examiner or 
the applicant, whether the citing patent is assigned to the same party as the 
cited patent (a “self-citation”) or a third party, and whether the citing patent 
is in the same or a different technology class as the baseline patent. The 
“generality” or technological variety of the forward citations received by 
each patent is also calculated, using the methodology pioneered by 
Professors Hall, Jaffe, and Trajtenberg.128 
 
 125 See Chien, supra note 97, at 298–99 (describing various “intrinsic” and “acquired” attributes of 
patents). 
 126 See Hall et al., supra note 118, at 13; see also Galasso & Schankerman, supra note 8, at 338 
(using these technology classes). 
 127 Hall et al., supra note 118, at 11–12. 
 128 See id. at 21 (calculating “generality” as the Herfindahl–Hirschman concentration index (HHI) of 
forward citations based on their technology fields). 
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Finally, several variables are constructed using the National Bureau of 
Economic Research (NBER) database, which compare the patents in the 
dataset to relevant subsets of the overall population. These include the 
technology class concentration index based on the portfolio sizes of the top 
four patent owners in each class,129 the number and details of all other patents 
in the same filing year and technology class cohort, and comparisons of the 
number of claims, duration of prosecution, and backward citations of patents 
with their relevant cohorts.130 
The principal dependent variable of interest is a binary flag indicating 
whether the patent was held valid or invalid. The sign and magnitude of this 
flag’s coefficient in the regression models described below indicates whether 
there is a significant relationship between validity and citations. These 
regressions principally use log-transformed citation counts to ensure 
normality of the dependent variable in the regressions.131 Appendix A reports 
relevant statistics of the patents and key citation measures. 
III. INITIAL ANALYSIS AND ROBUSTNESS CHECKS132 
Using the dataset constructed and variables coded as described above, 
the next Part describes the analyses employed and robustness tests 
conducted. In particular, the validity–citation relationship is modeled using 
regression analysis, steps are taken to check and control for possible 
selection bias, the potential for endogeneity is addressed, and finally, the 
analysis is repeated on an independent dataset of valid and invalid patents.133 
 
 129 This is calculated using the HHI methodology employed by many, including Galasso and 
Schankerman. See Galasso & Schankerman, supra note 8, at 324–26. 
 130 See infra Section IV.B.1 (discussing information variables). 
 131 This transformation is performed by taking the natural logarithm of the number of citations plus 
one, following the methodology of Galasso and Schankerman, supra note 8, at 354. This converts the 
citation distribution into a normal distribution, which is confirmed using a Kolmogorov–Smirnov test, 
which is a common method of testing for normality by checking whether two samples are drawn from 
the same distribution. 
 132 For data visualization tools that allow for additional exploration of the data used in the Article, 
visit the following link: https://nulr.shinyapps.io/patents. Materials are permanently archived at 
https://doi.org/10.21985/N2KJ22. 
 133 The following software packages were used to conduct the analysis: Marek Hlavac, Stargazer: 
Well-Formatted Regression and Summary Statistics Tables: R Package Version 5.2.2, CENTRAL 
EUROPEAN LABOUR STUDIES INSTITUTE (CELSI) (2018), https://CRAN.R-project.org/package= 
stargazer [https://perma.cc/A7WH-5D4A] (tables); Hadley Wickham, Tidyverse: Easily Install and Load 
the “Tidyverse” Version 1.2.1, R STUDIO (2017), https://cran.r-
project.org/web/packages/tidyverse/index.html [https://perma.cc/5CXB-WQWQ]; and Hao Zhu, 
KableExtra: Construct Complex Table with “kable” and Pipe Syntax, CRAN (2018), https://cran.r-
project.org/web/packages/kableExtra/index.html [https://perma.cc/GV5S-B7EB]. The following was 
used for reference: Yihui Xie, knitr: A Comprehensive Tool for Reproducible Research in R, in 
IMPLEMENTING REPRODUCIBLE RESEARCH 3 (Victoria Stodden et al. eds., 2014). 
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A. Modeling the Validity–Citation Relationship 
Initial comparison of forward citation counts reveals that the valid 
patents in the dataset received more forward citations than the invalid 
patents.134 However, this does not necessarily correspond to technological 
impact. Several factors influence citations, and the observed difference may 
be driven by technology class,135 cohort characteristics,136 or the intrinsic 
attributes of the patents themselves,137 irrespective of validity. Accordingly, 
regression analysis is used and several robustness checks are performed to 
control for these factors. 
The first analysis constructs a multivariate log-linear regression model 
of the citations received by each patent.138 In this model, the log-transformed 
number of forward citations constitutes the dependent variable, and multiple 
observed variables including the binary valid or invalid flag are used as 
regressors. Forward citations are often associated with the value of the 
underlying technology in its relevant market, which is not easily 
observable.139 For this reason, consistent with other models of forward 
citations, certain models include the number of citations received early in the 
patent’s lifetime as a proxy for inherent technology value.140 Appendix B 
reports details of the modeling procedure. 
Each model reveals a significant positive relationship between validity 
and the citation measure of interest. This holds true when the dependent 
variable is restricted to citations made by USPTO examiners versus those 
made by applicants. Previous studies exploring applicants’ incentives have 
found that applicants may avoid searching for and citing relevant prior art 
during patent prosecution.141 As shown in Appendix C, there is a significant 
 
 134 A t-test of the log-transformed citation counts reveals strong significance at the 0.1% level. 
 135 See Hall et al., supra note 118, at 13 (discussing heterogeneity between subclasses). 
 136 See, e.g., Aditi Mehta et al., Identifying the Age Profile of Patent Citations: New Estimates of 
Knowledge Diffusion, 25 J. APPLIED ECON. 1179, 1180–81 (2010) (discussing the cohort effect). 
 137 See, e.g., Nathan Falk & Kenneth Train, Patent Valuation with Forecasts of Forward Citations, 
12 J. BUS. VALUATION & ECON. LOSS ANALYSIS 101, 117 (2017). 
 138 This uses an iterative procedure whereby variables are added successively and tested for improved 
fit. Appendix B reports the results of successive models. 
 139 See Allison et al., Valuable Patents, supra note 97, at 455 (identifying a strong relationship 
between forward citations and litigation, which the authors use as a proxy for patent value); Michael J. 
Mazzeo, Samantha Zyontz & Jonathan H. Ashtor, Explaining the “Unpredictable”: An Empirical 
Analysis of U.S. Patent Infringement Awards, 35 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 58, 63–66 (2013) (reporting the 
correlation between forward citations and infringement awards). 
 140 See, e.g., Galasso & Schankerman, supra note 8, at 331 (noting that the number of claims and 
citations per claim are commonly used indicators of patent value); Falk & Train, supra note 137, at 103 
(discussing early citations as an indicator of future citations). 
 141 Alcácer et al., supra note 68, at 417 (“[F]irms’ decisions to search for prior art – and the resulting 
‘quality’ of issued patents – are likely to reflect field-specific factors related to the value and use of patents 
in those fields.”); Christopher A. Cotropia et al., Do Applicant Patent Citations Matter?, 42 RES. POL’Y 
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positive relationship between validity and each alternate citation measure. 
This suggests that the observed relationship holds despite possible 
tendencies of applicants to cite to fewer or selective patents. 
Regressions are also run using only citations made by third parties, 
excluding self-citations. Self-citations are citations made by patents owned 
by the same applicant as the cited patent, and they may skew the results for 
applicants that own large or dense patent portfolios. Concerns about the 
possibility of patents impeding subsequent innovation often focus on 
inventions made by third parties, on the theory that future improvements 
made by the patent owner simply increase her individual private benefit.142 
Both third-party citations and self-citations exhibit a significant positive 
relationship with patent validity.143 This suggests that the relationship 
between valid versus invalid patents and cumulative innovation is not limited 
to cumulative developments made only by the same or third-party 
applicants.144 
B. Controlling for Selection Bias 
To ensure robustness, several tests are run to confirm that the results are 
not driven by the particular selection of the patents in the dataset. These tests 
are described below, and the full results are provided in Appendix E. 
First, if there is a significant average age difference between the valid 
and invalid patents, truncation of forward citation counts could be a reason. 
Analysis reveals a slight average age difference between the two sets.145 To 
control for potential truncation, another flag is coded to identify the youngest 
patents in the dataset and added to the regressions. Additionally, as a second 
check, the regressions are rerun after excluding all patents for which the 
truncation flag is true. Finally, the regressions are restricted to only citations 
 
844, 851 (2013) (discussing evidence that applicants may not always comply with their duty of candor); 
Mark Lemley & Bhaven N. Sampat, Examiner Characteristics and the Patent Grant Rate 10 (Jan. 3, 2009) 
(manuscript for the UC Berkeley Law & Econ. Workshop), 
https://escholarship.org/uc/item/44n9w3gk#main [https://perma.cc/T6ZZ-XPMA] (finding that 
applicants are more likely to search for prior art in certain technology fields than others). 
 142 Self-citations are a strong indicator of private patent value. See Allison et al., Valuable Patents, 
supra note 97, at 454 (finding a strong relationship between self-citations and litigation); Hall et al., supra 
note 8, at 31–33 (finding a strong relationship between self-citations and stock market value). 
 143 See infra Appendix C. 
 144 By contrast, Galasso and Schankerman, supra note 8, at 354, found that self-citations decreased 
to certain patents held by large applicants post-invalidation, whereas third-party citations by new market 
entrants increased. Those findings reflect market dynamics and the effect of patents on competition, 
whereas the present results suggest that the relationship between validity and cumulative innovation is 
perhaps more a function of technological importance. 
 145 The average issue year is 1998 for valid and 2000 for invalid patents. (The median issue year is 
1999 for valid and 2000 for invalid patents). 
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received during the first ten years of the patents’ term, for which there is full 
data given the minimum age requirement in the dataset construction.146 The 
coefficient on the validity flag remains strongly significant and positive in 
each of these tests. Accordingly, this shows that the findings above are not 
the result of age truncation in forward citations received by the valid versus 
invalid patents in the dataset. 
It is also possible that the dataset randomly includes more valid patents 
with high citation counts and more invalid patents with low citation counts. 
Although this is unlikely to arise at random given the large sample size, it 
can be controlled for by successively excluding valid and invalid patents 
with the highest five, ten, and twenty percent of citation counts relative to 
their respective distributions. The findings above are robust across each cut. 
For good measure, the top fifty percent are also excluded as the next step, 
and then this filter is flipped to exclude the bottom fifty percent from each 
set, but neither test changes the results. This shows that an imbalance of 
many highly cited patents in the set of valid or invalid patents is not driving 
the results. 
The next robustness check compares the intrinsic attributes of each 
valid and invalid patent to check for significant differences between the two 
sets. There is no statistical difference between the number of total and 
independent claims, length of the written description or abstract, or number 
of inventors, after controlling for technology class, age, and filing year. 
There is also no significant difference in the number of backward citations.147 
Finally, there is a major source of selection bias that is not being 
controlled for: namely, that the dataset is selected only from patents that have 
been asserted by their owners and fully litigated to an adjudication of 
validity. Asserted patents have been found to be among the most valuable,148 
and rational parties are likely to litigate fully in the face of high uncertainty 
as to the expected outcome or unusually high personal stakes.149 However, 
both of these forms of selection bias are likely to affect the valid and invalid 
patents equally and are therefore unlikely to skew the results—that is, they 
should not result in more citations received by one group relative to the other. 
Moreover, it is impossible to study differences between valid and invalid 
 
 146 See supra Section II.C. 
 147 See supra Section II.C (overall backward citations are negative when controlling for relevant prior 
art). 
 148 See Allison et al., Valuable Patents, supra note 97, at 439; see also Allison et al., Patent Quality 
and Settlement Among Repeat Patent Litigants, supra note 100, at 680 (analyzing the value of litigated 
patents relative to nonlitigated patents). 
 149 See George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 13 J. LEGAL 
STUD. 1, 5, 16–17 (1984). 
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patents without relying on adjudications of validity, given that prior to 
adjudication, all patents are presumed valid.150 
C. Addressing Endogeneity 
Despite robustness across a variety of citation measures and 
subsamples, unobserved factors could drive the relationship between validity 
and citations. For example, efforts of the patent owner in the litigation may 
influence the final outcome on validity, and a patent owner may fight harder 
to protect her patent if it has higher private value (which corresponds to a 
higher expected citation count). Professors Galasso and Schankerman 
address this form of endogeneity in their 2014 study, writing that “a positive 
shock to the value of the underlying technology may increase citations to a 
patent and, at the same time, induce the patentee to invest heavily in the case 
to avoid invalidation.”151 
This particular concern is somewhat less relevant to the present study 
given that lifetime citations are being used here. As mentioned above, 
Professors Galasso and Schankerman are observing the difference between 
pre- and post-litigation citations for patents that were invalidated versus 
patents that were upheld,152 and late-stage increases in technology value may 
obscure the relationship between invalidation and new entry from previously 
blocked competitors.153 By contrast, this study observes citations accruing 
over the lifetime of a patent from birth, meaning that late-stage changes, 
however caused, will have less relative impact on overall citation counts. 
Nonetheless, the effects of late-stage increases in technology value can 
further be ruled out by restricting analysis to the first few years of the patent 
term. Citations received during the early years of the patent’s lifespan arise 
before the patent is adjudicated and, in many cases, before technology value 
is even apparent. Accordingly, restricting the dependent variable to citations 
received in the first two, three, and five years of the patent’s term, 
respectively, reveals that valid patents still receive significantly more 
citations than invalid patents during these limited time periods. The results 
of this analysis are shown in Appendix D. 
Still, it is possible that patent owners may have superior knowledge 
about the value of their patents early on, leading them to fight harder to 
 
 150 35 U.S.C. § 282 (2012) (“A patent shall be presumed valid.”). 
 151 Galasso & Schankerman, supra note 8, at 334. 
 152 Id. at 329–33 (describing their main regression specification). 
 153 For instance, a finding of validity due to a patent owner’s efforts to protect a patent that has 
increased in value would register as a positive relationship between post-adjudication citations and 
validity, and new entry after a blocking patent is invalidated would likewise register as a positive 
relationship between citations and invalidity. Id. at 334 (discussing endogeneity in their dataset). 
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protect patents that have greater inherent value. However, effort alone does 
not guarantee outcome.154 Indeed, studies of patent litigation have found that 
litigation outcomes are not predominantly determined by party effort.155 For 
example, both parties are likely to fight harder when the stakes are high, 
meaning that increased effort by the patent owner is likely to be met by 
corresponding extra effort by his or her opponent.156 
Several additional tests can also be employed to rule out the possibility 
that endogeneity is affecting the results. First, if patent owners fight harder 
to protect patents that have higher value from issuance, then the early few 
years of forward citations can be used as a proxy to identify and exclude 
these patents. Running successive regressions excluding the top ten, twenty, 
thirty, forty, and fifty percent of patents by early citation count157 
demonstrates that the relationship between validity and citations is invariant 
to early technology value. The results are shown in Appendix D. 
Details of the litigation itself can also be used as a proxy for litigant 
effort. The decision to appeal a case requires additional investments of time 
and money, and parties may be more likely to commit these resources when 
the patents are more valuable. Several alternative regressions are run 
excluding cases that were appealed, cases where the patent owner appealed 
the district court’s finding of invalidity, and cases where the accused 
infringer appealed the district court’s finding of validity. As shown in 
Appendix D, the results hold consistent across each subset of cases. 
Finally, a direct statistical test can also be conducted to further rule out 
endogeneity. Following a similar methodology to that employed by 
 
 154 In particular, it seems unrealistic to think that the strong positive relationship observed across 
more than 900 patents adjudicated during an eight-year timespan of court decisions is driven 
systematically by the litigation efforts of patent owners. Moreover, despite the endogeneity in Professors 
Galasso and Schankerman’s dataset, their ordinary least squares (OLS) regression revealed no significant 
correlation between patent invalidation and subsequent citations, id. at 339, suggesting that the absolute 
effect of endogeneity is not overwhelming relative to other factors. 
 155 See Jonathan H. Ashtor, Opening Pandora’s Box: Analyzing the Complexity of U.S. Patent 
Litigation, 18 YALE J.L. & TECH. 217, 233–34 (2016) (finding litigant efforts are generally equal and 
finding no relation between effort and outcome); Jay P. Kesan & Gwendolyn G. Ball, How Are Patent 
Cases Resolved? An Empirical Examination of the Adjudication and Settlement of Patent Disputes, 
84 WASH. U. L. REV. 237, 311 (2006) (examining patent case complexity and measures of litigant 
expenditures); see also Priest & Klein, supra note 149, at 5 (1984) (predicting that case outcomes should 
generally be random given the selection of disputes into litigation). 
 156 See Ashtor, supra note 155, at 233–34. Moreover, patents are presumed valid in litigation, and 
the burden of proving invalidity falls not on the patent owner but on her opponent. 35 U.S.C. § 282 
(2012). Thus, if anything, the final outcome is more likely susceptible to the effort expended by the 
opponent in searching for invalidating prior art. 
 157 Specifically, each cut excludes the relevant percentage of all patents (valid and invalid 
combined); however, percentages are computed relative to the distributions of each technology class to 
avoid changing the technology composition of the dataset. 
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Professors Galasso and Schankerman,158 the test requires modeling the 
suspected endogenous variable (validity) using an instrument that strongly 
correlates with it. The unexplained variation from this model (estimated by 
residual values) represents unobservable factors, such as litigant effort and 
other endogenous effects. Including these residuals as a regressor in the 
model of forward citations tests whether these effects are significantly 
influencing citation counts. 
The instrument is constructed by recognizing that many patents are 
invalidated when new prior art, not cited during examination, is found during 
litigation.159 Accordingly, patents that fail to cite potentially relevant prior art 
may be more susceptible to being invalidated.160 Using the NBER dataset, 
patents in the same filing year and technology class cohort are identified that 
cite one or more prior art references in common with the dataset patents, and 
the extent of backward citations made by the dataset patents are compared to 
the distribution of citations made by their peers.161 As shown in Appendix D, 
this instrument is significantly associated with patent validity, all else 
equal.162 Adding the residuals from this model to the forward citations 
regression with the same controls reveals no evidence of strong endogeneity 
between validity and citations in the dataset. 
D. Independent Verification 
Finally, another test is conducted to further ensure that the observed 
results are not biased by endogeneity or idiosyncrasies of the original dataset. 
Specifically, the results are replicated on an independent dataset of patents 
held valid or invalid. This is compiled from the set of all of the Federal 
 
 158 See Galasso & Schankerman, supra note 8, at 339 n.18, (citing Douglas Rivers & Quang H. 
Vuong, Limited Information Estimators and Exogeneity Tests for Simultaneous Probit Models, 39 J. 
ECONOMETRICS 347 (1988)); see also JEFFREY M. WOOLDRIDGE, INTRODUCTORY ECONOMETRICS: A 
MODERN APPROACH 506–36 (4th ed. 2009) (describing a similar test with linear regression models). 
 159 See John R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, Empirical Evidence on the Validity of Litigated Patents, 
26 AIPLA Q.J. 185, 251 (1998) (finding that patents are more likely to be invalidated on the basis of prior 
art that was not before the USPTO); see also Alan Devlin, Revisiting the Presumption of Patent Validity, 
37 SW. U. L. REV. 323, 331–32 (2008) (citing Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Bausch & Lomb Inc., 909 F.2d 
1464, 1467 (Fed. Cir. 1990), and Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States, 717 F.2d 1351, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 
1983)). 
 160 See Yan Liu et al., Latent Graphical Models for Quantifying and Predicting Patent Quality 
17 PROC. ACM SIGKDD INT’L CONF. ON KNOWLEDGE DISCOVERY & DATA MINING 1145, 1149 (2011), 
https://researcher.watson.ibm.com/researcher/files/us-kclang/Patent%20Quality%20KDD%202011.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/6BVK-8DC8] (using prior art citations in a model to predict patent validity). 
 161 Specifically, the number of standard deviations from the mean of the backward citations is 
computed for each of the dataset patents relative to its peer group. 
 162 As reported by Risch, the coefficient on the overall number of backward citations in the validity 
model is negative, indicating that more citations correlate with a lower likelihood of validity. Risch, supra 
note 102, at 70 (finding a negative correlation between backward citations and validity). 
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Circuit’s validity opinions that are published on Westlaw from 1990 through 
2012.163 Using the same filters to exclude patents that are younger than ten 
years from issuance,164 383 valid and 443 invalid patents remain. A full set 
of variables is coded for each of these patents, using the same procedure 
described above for the original dataset. 
Running the regressions above, using this appellate dataset, finds that 
these valid patents also receive significantly more lifetime citations than the 
invalid patents. However, the full appellate set includes some degree of 
overlap with the original dataset (i.e., patents that were appealed during the 
relevant time period).165 Filtering out these patents leaves 308 unique valid 
patents and the same number of invalid patents. Repeating the regressions 
on only the unique portion of the appellate dataset again reveals a significant 
positive relationship between validity and forward citations. 
There is some heterogeneity between appealed patents and those 
adjudicated only at the district court level. Combining the datasets, and 
coding interaction flags indicating whether the patent was held valid by the 
district court or on appeal, reveals that appealed valid patents have lower 
average citation counts than non-appealed valid patents. This makes sense, 
because parties are more likely to appeal a case where validity is less 
certain.166 In turn, if the hypothesis above about validity and information 
content holds true, then one would expect more questionable validity to 
correspond to lower information content, which in turn may result in a 
weaker impact on future technologies. 
E. Illustration of Results 
This Section illustrates the results using a series of plots.167 This starts 
with the most revealing picture, which shows average lifetime citations 
accruing over the patent term for valid and invalid patents, respectively. 
Figure 1 clearly shows the strong positive relationship between validity and 
citations, and the continuity of this relationship throughout the patent term. 
 
 163 To facilitate analysis, cases that affirmed the district court’s holding without written opinion are 
excluded. 
 164 Also, as above, a small number of very old patents (pre-4,000,000 series) are excluded. 
 165 There are 210 patents in the original dataset that overlap with the Federal Circuit dataset. 
 166 This follows from the same logic that disputes are more likely to be litigated in the first instance 
where the outcome is uncertain. See Priest & Klein, supra note 149, at 45. 
 167 Although figures in two dimensions cannot fully reflect multivariate analysis, the figures in this 
Section are useful to identify key features and guide the analysis of information content below. 
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FIGURE 1: FORWARD CITATIONS BY PATENT VALIDITY 
The next figure separates citations made by applicants from those made 
by USPTO examiners and shows these citation patterns side by side. Both 
applicant and examiner citations exhibit a positive relationship with validity. 
This result should be viewed in light of recent findings that USPTO 
examiners tend to rely on the prior art they find during their own searches, 
rather than references submitted by applicants, in making substantive 
anticipation and obviousness rejections of patent applications.168 
 
 168 See Cotropia et al., supra note 141, at 851 (“Another possible explanation is that examiners are 
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FIGURE 2: FORWARD CITATIONS BY CITATION SOURCE AND PATENT VALIDITY 
Next, the data are split according to the six main technology categories 
defined by Professors Hall, Jaffe, and Trajtenberg: Chemical, Computers & 
Communications, Drugs & Medical, Electrical & Electronics, Mechanical, 
and Others.169 Each category-specific distribution is illustrated using box 
plots, superimposing valid and invalid patents. Note that median lines are 
illustrated, and differences in means (all of which are larger for valid patents) 
are provided in the labels. This shows generally that the results are most 
prevalent in certain technology fields, as discussed further below. 
 
 169 Hall et al., supra note 118, at 13. 
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FIGURE 3: FORWARD CITATIONS BY PATENT TECHNOLOGY CLASS AND VALIDITY 
Figure 3 illustrates some heterogeneity across technology classes, and 
class-specific regressions only reveal a statistically significant effect in the 
Chemical (ten-percent level), Computers & Communications (five-percent 
level), and Drugs & Medical (one-percent level) classes; the Others class 
also appears nearly significant (approximately the twenty-five-percent 
level). Repeating the analysis with the full set of patents using a set of 
interaction variables that identify the valid patents in each class avoids the 
low data counts of the class-specific regressions, and it reveals that all but 
two classes, Electrical & Electronic (p-val=0.379) and Mechanical (p-
val=0.911), are significant or nearly significant at the ten-percent level.170 
 
 170 See infra Appendix F. 
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Moreover, those two classes still have relatively small sample sizes and low 
overall citation counts, which are expected to contribute to the lack of 
significance. 
The preceding analysis identifies and investigates the relationship 
between patent validity and cumulative innovation. The next Part will 
examine a possible reason underlying the observed relationship based on 
differing levels of information content between valid and invalid patents. 
IV. INFORMATION CONTENT AND TECHNOLOGICAL IMPACT 
The next set of analyses investigates whether the relationship observed 
above between validity and citations corresponds to differences in the 
information content of the patents. In particular, this seeks to determine 
whether patents held valid disclose more and/or higher quality technical 
information to subsequent inventors than patents held invalid and whether 
this in turn generates more future citing patents. The analyses find striking 
evidence of the anticipated relationship between information content and 
cumulative innovation. 
First, it is helpful to briefly describe the theory behind how the 
information content of a patent is transmitted to other inventors. Both 
Professors Romer and Scotchmer claim that inventors read existing patents 
for inspiration and guidance in developing new inventions.171 However, 
literal transmission might not occur in all instances, particularly because 
inventors often have incentives to avoid reviewing prior patents.172 
Nonetheless, inventors may observe embodiments of patented inventions on 
the market and derive inspiration thereby.173 And corporate R&D 
departments may reverse engineer the patented products of their competitors 
 
 171 Romer, supra note 28, at S84 (“[O]ther inventors are free to spend time studying the patent 
application for the widget and learn knowledge that helps in the design of a [widget].”); Scotchmer, supra 
note 33, at 39 (“[D]isclosure . . . is the vehicle by which technical knowledge is passed from the patenting 
firm to its competitors.”); id. at 39 n.16. 
 172 See supra note 141 and accompanying text. Willfulness enhances an infringer’s potential liability 
if she has prior knowledge of the patent, creating a disincentive to search for prior art. See Mark A. 
Lemley & Ragesh K. Tangri, Ending Patent Law’s Willfulness Game, 18 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1085, 
1085 (2003). 
 173 One principal function of the patent system is to provide incentives for commercialization of new 
technologies by facilitating downstream development and coordination of resources necessary to bring 
new products to market. See F. Scott Kieff, Coordination, Property, and Intellectual Property: An 
Unconventional Approach to Anticompetitive Effects and Downstream Access, 56 EMORY L.J. 327, 328–
29 (2006) (discussing how patents facilitate coordination of development resources). See generally 
Edmund W. Kitch, The Nature and Function of the Patent System, 20 J.L. & ECON. 265 (1977) (theorizing 
how patents facilitate downstream development and commercialization). 
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to learn from their designs.174 Thus, patents facilitate literal knowledge 
transfer through their written descriptions as well as tacit knowledge transfer 
through embodiments of their claimed inventions. Patents are arguably 
uniquely situated for such knowledge transfer given the disclosure 
requirements imposed by patent law. 
The analysis below employs two strategies to observe the relationship 
between the information content of a patent and its impact on future 
technological progress. First, the statutory criteria of patent validity are used 
to examine whether adjudicated failures of information disclosure 
correspond with reduced technological impact. Next, direct measurements of 
the information disclosed and claimed in a patent are developed, and these 
are used to examine how technological impact varies accordingly. 
A. Basis for Invalidation and Technological Impact 
The basis on which a patent is invalidated provides a proxy for 
identifying patents with greater or lesser information content, and such 
identification in turn is useful for understanding the differences observed 
above in cumulative innovation. A natural hierarchy emerges across the 
statutory criteria with respect to information content. First, patents lacking 
novelty,175 whereby all elements of the claimed invention were previously 
disclosed in a single piece of prior art,176 by definition contribute no new 
information to the public knowledge stock.177 Next, patents held obvious, 
whereby all elements of the claimed invention are found in a combination of 
related prior art references,178 may contribute some information but likely 
have minimal productive value. Even though they combine elements from 
multiple prior art sources,179 invalidity requires that the combination would 
be obvious to skilled practitioners.180 Finally, patents invalidated for failure 
of their written description,181 which otherwise satisfy the criteria of novelty 
 
 174 One consideration in whether to patent an invention is often “the ease with which the technology 
could be reverse-engineered if marketed but not patented.” Scotchmer, supra note 33, at 39. 
 175 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2012). 
 176 Verdegaal Bros. v. Union Oil Co. of Cal., 814 F.2d 628, 631 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (“A claim is 
anticipated only if each and every element as set forth in the claim is found, either expressly or inherently 
described, in a single prior art reference.”). 
 177 This assumes that any new information disclosed in a patent is likely to be covered by the scope 
of its claims; this is a reasonable assumption given that patents are drafted by specialized attorneys who 
are trained to maximize claim scope. 
 178 See 35 U.S.C. § 103. 
 179 KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 418 (2007); DyStar Textilfarben GmbH v. C.H. 
Patrick Co., 464 F.3d 1356, 1360, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2006). 
 180 By contrast, evidence of unexpected results from an otherwise obvious combination may preserve 
the validity of a patent under § 103. In re Dillon, 919 F.2d 688, 692–93 (Fed. Cir. 1990). 
 181 35 U.S.C. § 112. 
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and nonobviousness, may be expected to have relatively high information 
content by comparison. They do contribute some new technical information 
to the public, albeit in a potentially less comprehensible or usable format 
than valid patents.182 
To exploit these statutory differences, each invalidity case in the dataset 
is reviewed, and a flag is coded to indicate whether the reason was lack of 
novelty,183 obviousness,184 failure of written description or enablement,185 or 
other.186 Where a patent was invalidated for multiple reasons, each 
corresponding flag is coded as true.187 
Adding these flags to the regressions yields striking results. Consistent 
with the theory above, there is a significant negative relationship between 
lack of novelty and citations. Repeating these regressions using only third-
party citations and only examiner-made citations as the dependent variable 
yields the same observed effect.188 Additionally, as expected, patents 
invalidated under § 112 exhibit a positive relationship with citations relative 
to other invalid patents, although the relationship is weaker than for valid 
patents. Appendix G provides the regression results, and the box plots in 
Figure 4 illustrate the relationship, splitting the citation distribution 
according to the basis for invalidation: 
 
 182 For example, a patent invalidated under § 112 may fail to enable others to practice the invention 
without undue experimentation, In re Wands, 858 F.2d 731, 737 (Fed. Cir. 1988), or it may simply lack 
clarity in its description of the invention itself, Ariad Pharm., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1343, 
1351 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (en banc). 
 183 35 U.S.C. § 102. 
 184 Id. § 103. 
 185 Id. § 112. 
 186 Lack of subject matter under § 101 is also coded, but it is not separately analyzed below. 
 187 There are a very small number of patents that were invalidated on multiple grounds. A review of 
the cases reveals that parties often assert multiple statutory bases for invalidation, but courts often decline 
to address other arguments once they have concluded that a patent is invalid on one of the bases. 
 188 The novelty flag is generally significant at the five- or ten-percent level; only in the model of 
applicant citations is novelty not significant (but it is still signed negative). See generally Statistical 
Significance, WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Statistical_significance [https://perma.cc/5KXK-
KXY2]. 
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FIGURE 4: FORWARD CITATIONS BY PATENT BASIS FOR INVALIDATION 
 
B. Information Content Analysis 
The next analysis focuses on the information content of a patent 
directly, using several variables found in previous studies as well as new 
unique variables constructed here. The variables are: 
Backward Citations (BC): This is the absolute number of prior patents cited by 
the applicant or USPTO examiner during prosecution. Backward citations are 
widely used in studies of knowledge flow and patent quality.189 
BC Span: This represents the timespan between the first and last backward 
citation of a given patent. For simplicity, the patent numbers of the backward 
citations are used as approximations of their issue dates, and the difference 
between the largest and smallest is calculated; this difference is divided by the 
total number of backward citations.190 Accordingly, patents that draw upon a 
wider range of technological history, relative to the absolute number of citations 
made, will have a higher BC Span value. 
BC Sigma: This represents the relative number of backward citations made by 
a patent compared to other patents in its cohort. Specifically, the number of 
backward citations made by each patent in the dataset is divided by the average 
number of backward citations made by each other issued patent in the same 
technology class and filing year cohort, and divided by the standard deviation 
of the cohort distribution. 
 
 189 See, e.g., Jean O. Lanjouw & Mark Schankerman, Patent Quality and Research Productivity: 
Measuring Innovation with Multiple Indicators, 114 ECON. J. 441, 453 (2004) (using backward citations 
in a composite measure of patent quality). 
 190 Liu et al., supra note 160, at 1149 (using age and other characteristics of prior art citations in a 
model to predict patent validity). 
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Originality: This represents the technological variety of the backward citations, 
calculated using the formula described by Professors Hall, Jaffe, and 
Trajtenberg.191 
Claims: This is the number of independent claims.192 This provides a measure 
of the scope of exclusivity of a patent.193 
Dependent-per-Independent Claims: In addition to the number of independent 
claims, the number of dependent claims relative to independent claims is 
calculated. This provides additional detail about the scope of exclusivity, as 
dependent claims are often added to further specify broad independent 
claims.194 
Family Size: This is the number of other patents in the same patent family.195 
This variable also reflects the scope of exclusivity, as additional claims are often 
filed in multiple related patents. It additionally represents private value to the 
patent owner, as more related patents can reflect additional investment in 
developing the technology.196 
Inventors: This is the number of inventors named on each patent. The number 
of inventors has been shown to be associated with patent value and quality.197 
Written Description (WD) Length: This variable extracts the written description 
(excluding the abstract and claims) and counts the words. This represents the 
patent’s literal knowledge transfer based on the quantity of information 
provided in its written disclosure. The author is aware of no other study 
 
 191 See Hall et al., supra note 118, at 21 (calculating “originality” as the HHI of forward citations 
based on their technology fields). 
 192 The models below alternatively substitute the number of total claims for the number of 
independent claims and dependent-per-independent claims variables; the results are invariant to this 
substitution. 
 193 Lanjouw & Schankerman, supra note 189, at 443 (using number of claims in a composite measure 
of patent quality); see also Alan C. Marco et al., Patent Claims and Patent Scope 11–12 (USPTO, 
Economic Working Paper No. 2016-04, 2016), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2844964 
[https://perma.cc/PKU3-WGR7] (describing number of independent claims as a measure of patent scope). 
 194 See Marco et al., supra note 193, at 11–12 (citing World Class Tech. Corp. v. Ormco Corp., 
769 F.3d 1120, 1125 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (“The doctrine of claim differentiation creates a presumption that 
distinct claims, particularly an independent claim and its dependent claim, have different scopes.”)) 
(describing claim scope and the principle of claim differentiation). 
 195 Lanjouw & Schankerman, supra note 189, at 443, 447 (using family size of claims in a composite 
measure of patent quality). 
 196 See, e.g., Marco & Vishnubhakat, supra note 97, at 110–11 (discussing family size and post-
issuance investment). 
 197 Allison et al., Valuable Patents, supra note 97, at 465, 471 (using number of inventors in a model 
of patent value). 
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analyzing the length of a patent’s written description, although a few studies 
have analyzed patent text to assess information content and scope.198 
WD per Independent Claims: This variable uses the written description word 
count divided by the independent claims to provide a measure of the amount of 
disclosure relative to claim scope.199 
Abstract Length: This variable extracts the written abstract of each patent and 
counts the number of words. 
Figures: Figures are often used as illustrations of inventions and therefore may 
be relevant to literal knowledge transfer. Like WD Length, this also provides a 
measure of literal disclosure, but the number of figures is expected to be less 
useful because certain technologies are not representable by graphics and there 
is no statutory requirement to include figures. 
Length of Priority Claim: Certain patents derived their priority dates from 
previously filed applications with respect to all or a portion of their 
specifications.200 Given that priority claims represent disclosures that have 
already been published and may be older than the current state of the art, priority 
claims are expected to correspond with lower impact on future technology. The 
duration between the filing date and the original publication date is therefore 
recorded for each patent with a priority claim. 
From these unique variables, the following analyzes the relationship 
between information content variables and forward citations, constructs new 
information content metrics, and analyzes the relationship between patent 
validity and information content using these metrics. 
1. Information Content Variables and Forward Citations 
First, the information content variables described above are included in 
the forward citations model to analyze the relative importance of each 
factor.201 The coefficients are shown in Appendix H, and several specific 
results are relevant to the present analysis. First, regarding the information 
quantity variables, the word length of the written description is positive and 
 
 198 See Liu et al., supra note 160, at 1149 (analyzing the extent of alignment between the written 
description and claims of a patent to assess validity); Marco et al., supra note 193, at 12–13 (introducing 
a new metric of claim scope, independent claim length (ICL), calculated as the word length of the shortest 
independent claim). 
 199 Given collinearity with the WD Length measure, only one of these variables is included in the 
regressions. 
 200 For example, continuation patents are permitted to add claims to previously filed specifications 
without adding new subject matter, and continuation-in-part patents add some new subject matter and 
additional claims. See USPTO, MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE § 201.06(c) (2018), 
https://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/pac/mpep/mpep-0200.pdf [https://perma.cc/P9C7-L7WZ]. 
 201 Each of the count variables is log-transformed prior to analysis by taking the natural logarithm of 
the variable in interest plus one. 
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significant.202 This supports the hypothesis that both claim scope and 
information disclosure are important to future technological impact. 
Additionally, the number of inventors is positive and significant, which as 
expected also reflects information quantity and quality, as more inventors 
working on a given invention may bring more expertise and diverse views. 
Regarding claim scope, the number of independent claims is significant 
and positive, likely reflecting a possible relationship between exclusivity and 
technological impact. This is also indicated by the positive significance of 
patent family size, likely reflecting both broader claim scope and increased 
investment by the patent owner in the underlying technology.203 This is 
analyzed further in Section IV.C below using the length of the shortest 
independent claim as a measure of claim scope.204 
The backward citation variables are also relevant to focus on for the 
present study. The overall number of backward citations is less significant 
than the BC Sigma variable, representing the relative number of citations 
compared with other patents in the same cohort. Also, both the range of 
backward citations (BC Span) and their originality are positive and 
significant, indicating that range and diversity of backward citations are 
measures of productive information disclosure.205 Finally, regarding age of 
the disclosure, the length of the patent’s priority claim is negative and 
significant, indicating that previously disclosed information is associated 
with a weaker technology impact. 
2. Information Content Metrics 
To analyze the overall relationship between information content and 
technological impact, two metrics are constructed that combine the 
information content variables above. The first metric is a linear combination 
formed by weighting the value of each variable by its corresponding 
coefficient in the citations model. Using this combined metric in the citations 
model yields a strongly significant positive relationship. Since the 
coefficients are derived from the same model, this metric is interpreted as 
representing the aggregate portion of variation in forward citations that is 
attributable to the information content variables. 
Next, the information variables are combined directly, without 
weighting them with the model coefficients. To do so, each variable is 
converted into a z-score, which is a centered and unitless measure of the 
 
 202 Changing to absolute length of written description does not affect results. Changing from 
independent claims to total claims does not affect results. 
 203 See, e.g., Allison et al., Valuable Patents, supra note 97, at 457. 
 204 See infra Section IV.C. 
 205 See, e.g., Hall et al., supra note 118, at 21 (originality); Liu et al., supra note 160, at 1149 (prior 
art citations). 
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number of standard deviations from the mean.206 Z-scores can be combined 
directly without significant loss of data if they are positively correlated with 
each other.207 After checking cross-correlations, the abstract length (which is 
largely independent) is omitted and the negative value of the priority claim 
duration (which is negatively correlated) is used. 
The resulting combined metric is significantly correlated with the first 
information content metric. Additionally, using this metric in the citations 
model reveals a highly significant positive relationship, reflecting a strong 
relationship between information content and forward citations.208 
3. Validity and Information Content 
Now, the combined metrics are used to investigate whether valid and 
invalid patents exhibit differences in information content and whether the 
different types of invalid patents vary accordingly. First, the original 
information content metric is regressed on the validity flag and controls for 
technology class, cohort, and patent age. The validity coefficient is positive 
and significant at the five-percent level, indicating that valid patents have 
greater information content, according to this measure, than invalid patents. 
Next, the flags described above indicating the basis of invalidation 
(novelty, obviousness, or failure of written description and enablement under 
§ 112) are added to the regression. Although each of these flags has positive 
coefficients in the resulting model, there is a hierarchy of significance among 
them. Valid patents exhibit the strongest relationship with information 
content. Obvious patents also exhibit a positive relationship, significant at 
the ten-percent level. Patents invalidated under § 112 are significant at only 
the thirty-percent level, but this may suggest a moderate positive relationship 
given the smaller number of § 112 patents in the sample. Finally, patents 
lacking novelty come last. They exhibit the weakest relationship with 
information content, indicating that they have less citation-generating 
information content than any other patents.209 
The analysis above is repeated with the second information content 
metric. There is a strong positive relationship between this metric and 
forward citations. A similar hierarchy also exists when regressing the second 
metric on the flags for the basis of invalidation. Valid patents exhibit the 
strongest relationship, and patents invalidated for obviousness exhibit a 
 
 206 See, e.g., TOM TULLIS & BILL ALBERT, MEASURING THE USER EXPERIENCE: COLLECTING, 
ANALYZING, AND PRESENTING USABILITY METRICS 198 (2008) (discussing how z-scores can serve as a 
unitless measure of any continuous variable, thereby facilitating combination of variables that have 
different natural scales). 
 207 See id. 
 208 See infra Appendix H. 
 209 See infra Appendix H. 
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slightly weaker positive relationship. Also, the flag for patents lacking 
novelty is not significant, which by comparison indicates lower information 
content.210 
Both metrics indicate that obvious patents have higher information 
content than § 112 patents, whereas the analysis of forward citations relative 
to basis for invalidation found the reverse. The difference in results makes 
sense. With respect to the number of claims, length of written description, 
and scope of backward citations, obvious patents are expected to score higher 
given that, by definition, they represent a combination of multiple prior art 
technologies. However, more information is not necessarily better 
information. Because the content of obvious patents is older (and unoriginal), 
it is not as productively useful in spurring future progress. 
Finally, the relationship between information content and the likelihood 
that a patent will be held valid is tested by constructing a probit model of 
validity, which evaluates the probability of the regressors yielding a given 
binary outcome (in this case, 1 for valid and 0 for invalid). Adding the second 
information content metric, the unweighted combination of the information 
content variables, again reveals a significant positive relationship between 
validity and information content.211 
C. Claim Scope and Technological Impact 
The final analysis investigates how the scope of a patent’s claims relates 
to information content. This uses new metrics recently pioneered by the 
USPTO Office of the Chief Economist (OCE).212 In a large-scale study of all 
patents issued since 1976, the OCE measured the relationship between the 
number of independent claims (ICC) and the word length of the shortest 
independent claim (ICL) with several measures of claim scope and patent 
quality, including likelihood of issuance,213 patent maintenance,214 and early-
stage forward citations.215 They found that the total number of independent 
claims should be positively correlated with patent scope and private patent 
value, whereas the length of the shortest independent claim, in which 
 
 210 See infra Appendix H. 
 211 See infra Appendix H. 
 212 Marco et al., supra note 193, at 12–13 (introducing a new metric of claim scope, ICL, calculated 
as the word length of the shortest independent claim); see also Jeffrey M. Kuhn et al., Measuring Patent 
Scope: What Works, What Doesn’t, and How to Use it for Causal Inference 10 (2017) (unpublished 
manuscript), http://www.neil-t.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/01/Measuring_Patent_Scope.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/ZW4N-Q3XJ] (discussing hypothesis that “adding words to claims generally narrows 
them and subtracting words generally broadens them”). 
 213 Marco et al., supra note 193, at 14. 
 214 Id. at 21–22. 
 215 Id. 
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additional words correspond to more limitations that must be satisfied to 
prove infringement, should be negatively correlated.216 Their findings 
regarding ICL are particularly striking, as no previous study had analyzed 
claim scope in this way.217 Here, the correlation between ICL and patent 
validity is tested. In turn, ICC and ICL are used to measure whether claim 
scope is positively related to future technological impact as measured by 
lifetime citations in the models. 
First, the word length of the shortest independent claim of each patent 
in the dataset is computed,218 and the ICL of valid and invalid patents is 
compared. The valid patents have significantly greater ICL measures, or 
significantly more words per shortest independent claim. This is consistent 
with the OCE’s findings that ICL tends to increase as limitations are added 
during prosecution to overcome prior art rejections.219 That is, patents that 
issued with shorter independent claims may have undergone less scrutiny 
during prosecution and otherwise are more likely to be susceptible to 
challenges that prior art patents anticipate or obviate their more extensive 
claim breadth.220 
Next, ICL measures are compared across the bases of invalidation by 
regressing ICL on controls and various validity flags. Patents lacking novelty 
have significantly shorter ICL than other patents, all else equal. This 
suggests that patents that did not undergo as much restriction of their claim 
scope during prosecution are more vulnerable to invalidation for lack of 
novelty. 
Finally, ICL is added into the model of forward citations. As shown in 
Appendix I, initially no significant relationship is found between ICL and 
citations. However, the true relationship may be obscured by the relationship 
between validity and ICL. Splitting the data using two interaction variables, 
one indicating the ICL measure for valid patents and another indicating the 
ICL measure for invalid patents, yields results. The ICL-Valid interaction is 
negatively significant, which indicates that shorter—that is, broader—
claims in valid patents give rise to greater technological impact.221 In 
 
 216 Id. at 7–9. 
 217 Id. at 6 (“[T]here has been precious little empirical analysis of initial application claiming 
practices and changes to claims during the examination process.”). 
 218 These regressions use the natural logarithm of the word count, consistent with the approach to 
other explanatory variables. 
 219 Id. at 14 (“[T]he prosecution and examination process on average narrows the scope of 
applications by increasing ICL from 106 words at publication to 156 words at grant . . . .”). 
 220 See id. (“[A]pplications that go abandoned have a larger mass of shorter claims for PGPubs. This 
confirms that allowances are less frequent for applications that have claims of greater scope.”). 
 221 This is consistent with the OCE’s predictions that patents with greater novelty should be able to 
secure more claim scope and have greater impact on subsequent technologies. Id. at 23 (“First-movers in 
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addition, the independent claim count variable is also positively significant 
in this model. Taken together, this shows that, for valid patents, broader 
claims are associated with a greater impact on subsequent technology. 
CONCLUSION 
This study demonstrates that the disclosure function of patents 
promotes technological progress notwithstanding their private rights of 
exclusivity. According to the foundational “tradeoff” of patent theory, 
patents encourage disclosure of new and useful technical information for 
public benefit, but they do so by restricting public use of that information 
during their exclusive terms. Patented information remains available for 
productive public use in developing new inventions, notwithstanding the 
private rights of exclusivity. Moreover, private exclusivity and public benefit 
are both related to the information disclosure function of patents. The more 
technical information a patent discloses, the more likely it is to secure valid 
exclusive rights to its owner and the more progress it is likely to spur through 
future technological developments by others. Finally, by analyzing the 
breadth of claims that are validly supported by sufficient information 
disclosures, valid patents with broader exclusivity are found to have a 
greater positive impact on future technologies. 
The principal findings of this study are summarized as follows. First, 
valid patents promote more technological progress than invalid patents. This 
holds true for future inventions by third parties and follow-on developments 
by the patent owners. It is generally observable across technology classes. 
Second, among invalid patents, the basis on which they are invalidated 
corresponds to varying impacts on future technology. Patents invalidated for 
failure to disclose new technical information tend to have the weakest 
impact. 
Third, the information content–technological impact relationship is 
measurable directly using the intrinsic characteristics of a patent’s 
disclosure. Information content variables, and metrics based on them, 
correlate strongly with subsequent citations. 
Fourth, valid patents tend to have greater information content than 
invalid patents, as measured by these variables and metrics. In turn, the 
differences observed between the respective types of invalid patents map 
onto variations in information content. As expected, patents invalidated for 
lack of novelty have the least information content. 
 
a technology space have the opportunity to patent fundamental inventions. These seminal patents can be 
expected to have broader scope than the incremental inventions that follow.” (internal citation omitted)). 
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Finally, the private exclusivity granted by a patent’s claims does not 
effectively impede the technological impact of its information disclosure. By 
contrast, the claim breadth of valid patents correlates with greater impact on 
future technologies. 
Most significantly, as a general rule, the exclusivity and disclosure 
functions of patents work hand in hand. Where disclosure is working 
properly, as the criteria for patent validity require, the information so 
disclosed is available for productive use by other inventors. However, this 
also focuses attention on possible breakdowns of disclosure. If the proportion 
of patents lacking novelty is too high, the disclosure benefits of patents may 
be thwarted. 
These results also motivate several avenues for future research and 
policy focus. In particular, the nexus between information content and patent 
quality is an important area of inquiry. Future work will attempt to analyze 
the information content of patents more directly using natural language 
processing and other modern techniques that advance beyond rudimentary 
word counts. 
In summary, this study finds a positive relationship between patent 
validity, cumulative innovation, and information disclosure. These findings 
speak to tradeoff theory at the heart of patent discourse, suggesting that the 
public disclosure and private exclusivity functions of patents are not only in 
tension with each other. Rather, this study observes evidence of reciprocity 
between the two, whereby patents that disclose more and newer information 
are more likely to be valid, have broader claims, and give rise to more 
subsequent inventions. Accordingly, this study lends additional 
understanding and empirical data to the dynamic relationship between patent 
disclosure and exclusivity. 
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APPENDIX A: DESCRIPTION OF DATASET 
A. Patents 











Electrical Mechanical Others 
Valid 
37 (49.3%) 117 (37.5%) 97 (47.1%) 42 (64.6%) 38 (44.2%) 85 
(48.9%) 
Invalid 
38 (50.7%) 195 (62.5%) 109 (52.9%) 23 (35.4%) 48 (55.8%) 89 
(51.1%) 
Total 75 312 206 65 86 174 
 
B. Age and Date Ranges 
 
TABLE A.3: FILING YEAR–VALID PATENTS 
Min. 1st Qu. Median Mean 3rd Qu. Max. 
1979 1993 1997 1996 1999 2005 
  
TABLE A.4: FILING YEAR–INVALID PATENTS 
 
 
TABLE A.5: ISSUE YEAR–VALID PATENTS 
Min. 1st Qu. Median Mean 3rd Qu. Max. 
1982 1995 1999 1998 2002 2006 
 
TABLE A.6: ISSUE YEAR–INVALID PATENTS 
Min. 1st Qu. Median Mean 3rd Qu. Max. 
1977 1998 2000 2000 2003 2006 
  
Min. 1st Qu. Median Mean 3rd Qu. Max. 
1975 1995 1998 1997 2000 2005 
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C. Distribution of Citations 
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APPENDIX B: REGRESSION MODEL CONSTRUCTION 
 
TABLE B.1 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
R2 0.3064 0.3451 0.3531 0.7020 0.6077 
























(a) Base = HJT32 + ln(Age) + FileYr (decile) + ln(Ind.Clms.) + ln(BC) + Originality 
(b) Acquired = Assigned? (Bool) + Lien? (Bool) 
(c) Quality is calculated using the methodology proposed by Lanjouw and 
Schankerman (2004). However, because it includes a weighted measure of lifetime 
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APPENDIX C: INITIAL RESULTS AND ALTERNATIVE SPECIFICATIONS 
 
TABLE C.1: FORWARD CITATIONS (LOG) 
 Estimate Std. Err. t-value Pr(>|t|) Sig. 
(Intercept) 4.8 2.6 1.9 0.1 . 
ValidBTRUE 0.5 0.1 5.3 0.00E+00 *** 
HJT3212 0.1 0.6 0.3 0.8  
      
lnAge -0.6 0.3 -2 0 * 
FYr_dec.L -2.3 0.3 -8.4 0 *** 
      
lnIndClms 0.1 0 2.6 0 * 
lnBC 0.1 0 3.9 0 *** 
origvals 0.2 0.1 2.3 0 * 
      
lnEarlyFC 0.6 0 21.1 0 *** 
Residual standard error: 0.8381 on 859 degrees of freedom. 
Multiple R-squared: 0.6254. 
Adjusted R-squared: 0.6002. 
F-statistic: 24.73 on 58 and 859 DF, p-value: < 2.2e-16. 
 
TABLE C.2: EXAMINER CITATIONS (LOG) 
 Estimate Std. Err. t-value Pr(>|t|) Sig. 
(Intercept) 7 2.3 3.1 0 ** 
ValidBTRUE 0.5 0.1 5.7 0 *** 
HJT3212 -0.5 0.5 -1 0.3  
      
lnAge -0.8 0.3 -3.1 0 ** 
FYr_dec.L -2.4 0.2 -9.9 0 *** 
      
lnIndClms 0.1 0 2.5 0 * 
lnBC 0 0 1.5 0.1  
origvals 0.2 0.1 2.1 0 * 
      
lnEarlyFC 0.6 0 23.6 0 *** 
Residual standard error: 0.7442 on 859 degrees of freedom. 
Multiple R-squared: 0.6398. 
Adjusted R-squared: 0.6155. 
F-statistic: 26.31 on 58 and 859 DF, p-value: < 2.2e-16. 
  
113:943 (2019) Patented Information 
993 
TABLE C.3: APPLICANT CITATIONS (LOG) 
 Estimate Std. Err. t-value Pr(>|t|) Sig. 
(Intercept) 0 3.1 0 1  
ValidBTRUE 0.5 0.1 4.8 0 *** 
HJT3212 1.5 0.7 2.1 0 * 
      
lnAge -0.3 0.3 -0.8 0.4  
FYr_dec.L -2.2 0.3 -6.6 0 *** 
      
lnIndClms 0.1 0.1 2.3 0 * 
lnBC 0.2 0 5.9 0 *** 
origvals 0.2 0.1 1.6 0.1  
      
lnEarlyFC 0.6 0 17.2 0 *** 
Residual standard error: 1.005 on 859 degrees of freedom. 
Multiple R-squared: 0.5855. 
Adjusted R-squared: 0.5576. 
F-statistic: 20.92 on 58 and 859 DF, p-value: < 2.2e-16. 
 
TABLE C.4: THIRD PARTY CITATIONS (LOG) 
 Estimate Std. Err. t-value Pr(>|t|) Sig. 
(Intercept) 5.7 2.7 2.2 0 * 
ValidBTRUE 0.5 0.1 4.7 0 *** 
HJT3212 0.2 0.6 0.4 0.7  
      
lnAge -0.7 0.3 -2.3 0 * 
FYr_dec.L -2.5 0.3 -8.8 0 *** 
      
lnIndClms 0.1 0 2.1 0 * 
lnBC 0.1 0 3.3 0 *** 
origvals 0.2 0.1 1.8 0.1 . 
      
lnEarlyFC 0.7 0 20.9 0 *** 
Residual standard error: 0.8705 on 859 degrees of freedom. 
Multiple R-squared: 0.6233. 
Adjusted R-squared: 0.5978. 
F-statistic: 24.5 on 58 and 859 DF, p-value: < 2.2e-16. 
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APPENDIX D: ENDOGENEITY TESTS 
TABLE D.1: REGRESSING LOG OF EARLY YEARS OF CITATIONS 
 First 2 Years First 3 Years First 5 Years 
R2 0.3486 0.408 0.4136 









Validity p-val. 0.018 * 0.0104 * 0.00754 ** 
 
TABLE D.2: EXCLUDING PATENTS BASED ON EARLY CITATIONS PERCENTILE 
 Excl. 10% Excl. 20% Excl. 30% Excl. 40% Excl. 50% 
R2 0.4389 0.4741 0.4937 0.5266 0.5514 













Validity p-val. 1.75e-04 *** 1.99e-03 ** 3.87e-03 ** 2.11e-03 ** 4.23e-03 ** 
N 820 722 629 530 430 
 
TABLE D.3: EXCLUDING APPEALS 
 Excl. Appeals Excl. PH Appeals Excl. AI Appeals 
R2 0.66 0.6454 0.64 









Validity p-val. 0.02724 * 0.00251 ** 0.0120 * 
N 708 821 805 
 
A. Rivers–Vuong Analysis 
1. Prior Art Metric 
 
A metric is constructed representing the extent of relevant prior art cited 
by each patent, which will serve as instrument for validity. The value of the 
metric for each baseline patent is computed by counting the number of 
backward citations made by each patent that (i) is filed within two years (plus 
or minus) of the baseline patent’s application year, (ii) is within the same 
technology subclass, and (iii) cites any prior art patent that is cited by the 
baseline patent. The mean and standard deviation of this set of backward 
citation counts is calculated, and the metric is recorded as the baseline 
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patent’s number of standard deviations from this mean. Statistics for this 
metric are provided below. 
TABLE D.5: SUMMARY OF PRIORARTSIG1 
Min. 1st Qu. Median Mean 3rd Qu. Max. 





2. Prior Art Metric as an Instrument for Validity 
 
Adding the prior art metric described above into a probit model for 
validity indicates a strong negative relationship between the metric and 
validity, after controlling for technology class, age, patent characteristics and 
other relevant factors. 
TABLE D.6: VALIDITY PROBIT 
 Estimate Std. Err. t-value Pr(>|t|) Sig. 
(Intercept) 13.1 5.4 2.4 0 * 
PriorArtsig1 0.1 0 2.8 0 ** 
HJT3212 -2.4 1.1 -2.2 0 * 
      
lnAge -1.2 0.6 -2.1 0 * 
lnBC -0.1 0.1 -1.3 0.2  
      
lnDepPerIndCl 0 0.1 0.5 0.6  
Null deviance: 1264.5 on 917 degrees of freedom 
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3. Test for Endogeneity 
 
Adding the residuals of the validity probit into the full FC regression 
reveals no significance: 
TABLE D.7: LOG (FC) REGRESSION, ADDING PROBIT RESIDUALS 
 Estimate Std. Err. t-value Pr(>|t|) Sig. 
(Intercept) 7.1 3.8 1.9 0.1 . 
ValidBTRUE 0.2 0.6 0.3 0.8  
PBRegr_Validity_resid 0 0.3 0 1  
HJT3212 1.1 0.7 1.6 0.1  
...      
lnAge -0.8 0.4 -2 0 * 
      
lnDepPerIndCl 0.1 0 1.6 0.1 . 
Residual standard error: 0.8268 on 850 degrees of freedom. 
Multiple R-squared: 0.6393. 
Adjusted R-squared: 0.6109. 
F-statistic: 22.49 on 67 and 850 DF, p-value: < 2.2e-16. 
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APPENDIX E: SELECTION BIAS TESTS 
 
TABLE E.1: ADDING TRUNCATION FLAG (RETAINING AGE AND FILING YEAR) 
 Estimate Std. Err. t-value Pr(>|t|) Sig. 
(Intercept) 5.5 3.1 1.8 0.1 . 
ValidBTRUE 0.5 0.1 5.3 0 *** 
HJT3212 0.1 0.6 0.3 0.8  
      
lnAge -0.7 0.4 -1.9 0.1 . 
FYr_dec.L -2.3 0.3 -8.4 0 *** 
      
lnIndClms 0.1 0 2.5 0 * 
lnBC 0.1 0 3.9 0 *** 
origvals 0.2 0.1 2.3 0 * 
      
lnEarlyFC 0.6 0 21.1 0 *** 
      
Trunc_BTRUE -0.1 0.1 -0.4 0.7  
Residual standard error: 0.8385 on 858 degrees of freedom. 
Multiple R-squared: 0.6255. 
Adjusted R-squared: 0.5998. 
F-statistic: 24.29 on 59 and 858 DF, p-value: < 2.2e-16. 
 
TABLE E.2: ADDING TRUNCATION FLAG (EXCLUDING AGE AND FILING YEAR) 
 Estimate Std. Err. t-value Pr(>|t|) Sig. 
(Intercept) -0.2 0.5 -0.3 0.8  
ValidBTRUE 0.7 0.1 6.9 0 *** 
HJT3212 0.1 0.6 0.2 0.8  
      
lnIndClms 0.1 0 2.3 0 * 
lnBC 0.1 0 2.4 0 * 
origvals 0.2 0.1 1.7 0.1 . 
      
lnEarlyFC 0.5 0 17.2 0 *** 
      
Trunc_BTRUE -0.7 0.1 -9.6 0 *** 
Residual standard error: 0.9081 on 868 degrees of freedom. 
Multiple R-squared: 0.5556. 
Adjusted R-squared: 0.5305. 
F-statistic: 22.15 on 49 and 868 DF, p-value: < 2.2e-16. 
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TABLE E.3: EXCLUDING TRUNCATED PATENTS 
 Estimate Std. Err. t-value Pr(>|t|) Sig. 
(Intercept) 7.1 4.2 1.7 0.1 . 
ValidBTRUE 0.5 0.1 4.1 0 *** 
HJT3212 -2.5 1 -2.5 0 * 
      
lnAge -0.8 0.5 -1.8 0.1 . 
FYr_dec.L -1.4 0.6 -2.5 0 * 
      
lnIndClms 0.2 0.1 3 0 ** 
lnBC 0.1 0 2 0 * 
origvals 0.4 0.1 3 0 ** 
      
lnEarlyFC 0.6 0 15.6 0 *** 
Residual standard error: 0.8774 on 611 degrees of freedom. 
Multiple R-squared: 0.5923. 
Adjusted R-squared: 0.5542. 
F-statistic: 15.57 on 57 and 611 DF, p-value: < 2.2e-16. 
N: 669. 
 
TABLE E.4: FIRST TEN YEARS OF CITATIONS 
 Estimate Std. Err. t-value Pr(>|t|) Sig. 
(Intercept) 8.1 3.2 2.6 0 * 
ValidBTRUE 0.1 0.1 2.5 0 * 
HJT3212 1.1 0.6 1.9 0.1 . 
      
lnAge -0.9 0.4 -2.7 0 ** 
FYr_dec.L -1.5 0.3 -5.6 0 *** 
      
lnIndClms 0.1 0.1 1.2 0.2  
lnBC 0.1 0 2 0 * 
origvals 0.1 0.1 1.3 0.2  
      
lnEarlyFC 0.7 0 25 0 *** 
Residual standard error: 0.7828 on 850 degrees of freedom. 
Multiple R-squared: 0.6636. 
Adjusted R-squared: 0.6371. 
F-statistic: 25.03 on 67 and 850 DF, p-value: < 2.2e-16. 
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TABLE E.5: EXCLUDING HIGHEST (AND LOWEST) CITED PATENTS 
 Excluding Top Only Top 
50% 5% 10% 20% 50% 
R2 0.5938 0.5726 0.527 0.4837 0.4421 













Validity p-val. 1.12e-04*** 5.08e-05*** 6.48e-04*** 8.53e-03** 2.54e-06*** 
N 871 825 732 459 459 
 
TABLE E.6: COMPARISON OF ATTRIBUTES OF VALID VS. INVALID PATENTS 
 Valid Invalid Sig. 
p-val* Mean Median Mean Median 
Total Claims 24.42 18 29.82 22 0.7588 
Indep. Claims 3.868 3 4.833 2 0.2424 (-) 
WD length 7683 5620 8694 5481 0.3465 
Abstr. length 124 121 121 121 0.1676 
# Inventors 2.548 2 2.703 2 0.9374 
Bk. Citations 29.45 17 38.21 18 0.4075 
Originality 0.4763 0.5380 0.4851 0.5333 0.5598 
* p-values obtained by regressing attribute in question on HJT32, log(Age) 
and ValidB flag; significance of ValidB flag reported. Log-linear regression used 
for skewed attributes; quasi glm regression used for other non-normal attributes. 
 
TABLE E.7: FEDERAL CIRCUIT PATENTS—FORWARD CITATIONS (LOG) (INCLUDING 
OVERLAPPING BASE PATENTS) 
 Estimate Std. Err. t-value Pr(>|t|) Sig. 
(Intercept) 9.2 3.1 3 0 ** 
ValidBTRUE 0.2 0.1 2.7 0 ** 
HJT3212 -0.3 0.8 -0.4 0.7  
          
lnAge -1.2 0.3 -4 0 *** 
FYr_dec.L -1.8 0.3 -6.2 0 *** 
          
lnIndClms 0.1 0 2.5 0 * 
lnBC 0.1 0 1.7 0.1 . 
origvals 0.2 0.1 1.8 0.1 . 
      
lnEarlyFC 0.6 0 15.1 0 *** 
Residual standard error: 0.9133 on 773 degrees of freedom. 
Multiple R-squared: 0.5089. 
Adjusted R-squared: 0.4702. 
F-statistic: 13.13 on 61 and 773 DF, p-value: < 2.2e-16. 
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TABLE E.8: FEDERAL CIRCUIT PATENTS—FORWARD CITATIONS (LOG) (EXCLUDING 
OVERLAPPING BASE PATENTS) 
 Estimate Std. Err. t-value Pr(>|t|) Sig. 
(Intercept) -0.2 6.1 0 1  
ValidBTRUE 0.2 0.1 2.2 0 * 
HJT3212 -0.3 0.8 -0.4 0.7  
      
lnAge -0.3 0.6 -0.5 0.6  
FYr_dec.L -0.3 0.6 -0.5 0.6  
      
lnIndClms 0 0.1 0.6 0.5  
lnBC 0 0 0.7 0.5  
origvals 0.1 0.1 0.9 0.4  
      
lnEarlyFC 0.6 0 12.2 0 *** 
Residual standard error: 0.8737 on 564 degrees of freedom. 
Multiple R-squared: 0.4833. 
Adjusted R-squared: 0.4283. 
F-statistic: 8.791 on 60 and 564 DF, p-value: < 2.2e-16. 
TABLE E.9: COMBINED DISTRICT COURT AND FEDERAL CIRCUIT PATENTS 
 Estimate Std. Err. t-value Pr(>|t|) Sig. 
(Intercept) 3.3 2.5 1.3 0.2  
ValidxNonApp 0.2 0.1 2.9 0 ** 
ValidxApp 0.1 0.1 1.5 0.1 . 
InvalidxApp 0 0.1 -0.1 0.9  
HJT3212 -0.3 0.5 -0.6 0.6  
      
lnAge -0.6 0.2 -2.4 0 * 
FYr_dec.L -1.7 0.2 -7.6 0 *** 
      
lnIndClms 0.1 0 2.8 0 ** 
lnBC 0.1 0 4.6 0 *** 
origvals 0.2 0.1 3.3 0 *** 
      
lnEarlyFC 0.7 0 25.8 0 *** 
Residual standard error: 0.8849 on 1479 degrees of freedom. 
Multiple R-squared: 0.5587. 
Adjusted R-squared: 0.5399. 
F-statistic: 29.72 on 63 and 1479 DF, p-value: < 2.2e-16. 
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APPENDIX F: CLASS-SPECIFIC REGRESSIONS 






Electrical Mechanical Others 
R2 0.7115 0.4481 0.4985 0.6896 0.8426 0.5321 

































TABLE F.2: INCLUDING VALIDITY–TECHNOLOGY CLASS INTERACTION VARIABLES 
 Estimate Std. Err. t-value Pr(>|t|) Sig. 
(Intercept) -9.6 3.2 -3.0 0.00 ** 
ValidBxHJT1 0.4 0.3 1.5 0.12  
ValidBxHJT2 0.3 0.1 2.5 0.01 * 
ValidBxHJT3 0.5 0.1 3.3 0.00 ** 
ValidBxHJT4 0.2 0.3 0.9 0.38  
ValidBxHJT5 -0.0 0.2 -0.1 0.91  
ValidBxHJT6 0.2 0.2 1.4 0.15  
Residual standard error: 1.025 on 850 degrees of freedom. 
Multiple R-squared: 0.4456. 
Adjusted R-squared: 0.4019. 
F-statistic: 10.2 on 67 and 850 DF, p-value: < 2.2e-16. 
  
N O R T H W E S T E R N  U N I V E R S I T Y  L A W  R E V I E W 
1002 
APPENDIX G: BASIS OF INVALIDITY AND TECHNOLOGICAL IMPACT 
TABLE G.1: BASIS OF INVALIDITY REGRESSIONS 
 log (FC) log (3P FC) log (Ex. FC) log (Appl. FC) 
R2 0.5404 0.5309 0.5496 0.4946 











Validity p-val. 0.019 * 0.089 . 0.113 0.005 ** 
s102 p-val. 0.071 . (-) 0.014 * (-) 0.002 ** (-) 0.662 (-) 
S103 p-val. 0.678 0.817 0.721 (-) 0.153 
s112 p-val. 0.044 * 0.045 * 0.116 0.025 * 
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APPENDIX H: INFORMATION CONTENT AND TECHNOLOGICAL IMPACT 
TABLE H.1: SIGNIFICANCE OF INFORMATION CONTENT VARIABLES IN FORWARD 
CITATIONS MODEL 
Variable Coeff. p-value Sig. 
Bk. Citations 0.1 0.06 . 
BC Span 0.1 0 ** 
BC Sig. 0.1 0.04 * 
Originality 0.1 0.02 * 
Indep. Claims 0.2 0 *** 
Dep. per Indep. Claims 0 0.23  
Family Size 0.1 0.02 * 
# Inventors 0.1 0.05 * 
WD Length per Ind. Claim 0.1 0.01 ** 
Abstract Len. 0 0.61  
# Figures 0 0.69  
Length of Priority Claim -0.1 0.03 * 
TABLE H.2: REGRESSING INFO CONTENT METRIC #1 ON VALIDITY FLAG 
 Estimate Std. Err. t-value Pr(>|t|) Sig. 
(Intercept) 2.7 1.1 2.4 0.0 * 
HJT3212 -0.3 0.3 -1.2 0.2  
      
lnAge -0.3 0.1 -2.6 0.0 ** 
ValidBTRUE 0.1 0.0 2.1 0.0 * 
Residual standard error: 0.3821 on 871 degrees of freedom. 
Multiple R-squared: 0.1222. 
Adjusted R-squared: 0.07582. 
F-statistic: 2.635 on 46 and 871 DF, p-value: 5.148e-08. 
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TABLE H.3: REGRESSING INFO CONTENT METRIC #1 ON VALIDITY 
AND INVALIDITY BASIS FLAGS 
 Estimate Std. Err. t-value Pr(>|t|) Sig. 
(Intercept) 2.6 1.1 2.4 0.0 * 
HJT3212 -0.3 0.3 -1.1 0.3  
      
lnAge -0.3 0.1 -2.5 0.0 * 
ValidBTRUE 0.1 0.0 2.7 0.01 ** 
s102_BTRUE 0.0 0.0 1.0 0.33  
s103_BTRUE 0.1 0.0 1.8 0.07 . 
s112_BTRUE 0.1 0.1 1.1 0.29  
Residual standard error: 0.3819 on 868 degrees of freedom. 
Multiple R-squared: 0.126. 
Adjusted R-squared: 0.0767. 
F-statistic: 2.555 on 49 and 868 DF, p-value: 6.782e-08. 
 
A. Repeating Analysis with Info Content Metric #2 




TABLE H.5: REGRESSING FC ON INFO CONTENT METRIC #2 (PLUS CONTROLS) 
 Estimate Std. Err. t-value Pr(>|t|) Sig. 
(Intercept) -10 3.1 -3.4 0.0 *** 
      
InfoContVar 0.1 0.0 14 0.0 *** 
Residual standard error: 1.075 on 871 degrees of freedom. 
Multiple R-squared: 0.3753. 
Adjusted R-squared: 0.3424. 
F-statistic: 11.38 on 46 and 871 DF, p-value: < 2.2e-16. 
 
TABLE H.6: REGRESSING INFO CONTENT METRIC #2 ON VALIDITY FLAG 
 Estimate Std. Err. t-value Pr(>|t|) Sig. 
(Intercept) 38 12 3.1 0.0 ** 
HJT3212 -2.1 2.9 -0.7 0.5  
      
lnAge -4.7 1.4 -3.3 0.0 *** 
ValidBTRUE 0.7 0.3 2.4 0.02 * 
Residual standard error: 4.317 on 871 degrees of freedom. 
Multiple R-squared: 0.1799. 
Adjusted R-squared: 0.1366. 
F-statistic: 4.155 on 46 and 871 DF, p-value: < 2.2e-16. 
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TABLE H.7: REGRESSING INFO CONTENT METRIC #2 ON VALIDITY 
AND INVALIDITY BASIS FLAGS 
 Estimate Std. Err. t-value Pr(>|t|) Sig. 
(Intercept) 37 12 3.0 0.0 ** 
HJT3212 -1.9 2.9 -0.6 0.5  
      
lnAge -4.7 1.4 -3.3 0.0 *** 
ValidBTRUE 1.2 0.4 2.9 0.00 ** 
s102_BTRUE 0.5 0.5 1.1 0.26  
s103_BTRUE 0.8 0.5 1.6 0.10 . 
s112_BTRUE 0.6 0.6 1.1 0.29  
Residual standard error: 4.316 on 868 degrees of freedom. 
Multiple R-squared: 0.1831. 
Adjusted R-squared: 0.137. 
F-statistic: 3.97 on 49 and 868 DF, p-value: < 2.2e-16. 
TABLE H.8: PROBIT MODEL OF VALIDITY 
 Estimate Std. Err. t-value Pr(>|t|) Sig. 
(Intercept) -7.7 4 -1.9 0.1 . 
HJT3212 0.9 0.9 1 0.3  
      
lnAge 0.8 0.5 1.7 0.1 . 
FYr_dec.L -0.6 0.5 -1.3 0.2  
      
lnEarlyFC 0.1 0 1.8 0.1 . 
      
InfoContVar 0.1 0 4.2 0 *** 
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APPENDIX I: CLAIM BREADTH AND TECHNOLOGICAL IMPACT 
A. Relationship Between ICL and Validity 
TABLE I.1 
Avg. ICL of Valid Patents 128.5 words 
Avg. ICL of Invalid Patents 111.1 words 
t-test of log(ICL) p-val = 0.001048 
TABLE I.2: REGRESSING ICL ON BASIS OF INVALIDATION 
 Estimate Std. Err. t-value Pr(>|t|) Sig. 
(Intercept) 1.1 2 0.6 0.6  
HJT3212 0.4 0.5 0.8 0.4  
      
lnAge 0.3 0.2 1.5 0.1  
ValidBTRUE 0.1 0.1 1.2 0.2  
s102_BTRUE -0.1 0.1 -2.1 0 * 
s103_BTRUE 0 0.1 -0.6 0.5  
s112_BTRUE -0.1 0.1 -0.6 0.6  
Residual standard error: 0.6533 on 847 degrees of freedom 
Multiple R-squared: 0.2131 
Adjusted R-squared: 0.1667  
F-statistic: 4.588 on 50 and 847 DF, p-value: < 2.2e-16. 
B. Relationship Between ICL and Forward Citations 
TABLE I.3: SINGLE ICL MEASURE 
 Estimate Std. Err. t-value Pr(>|t|) Sig. 
(Intercept) 4.5 2.7 1.6 0.1  
ValidBTRUE 0.2 0.1 3 0 ** 
HJT3212 -0.2 0.6 -0.3 0.8  
...      
lnAge -0.5 0.3 -1.5 0.1  
FYr_dec.L -2.5 0.3 -8.7 0 *** 
...      
ICC 0.2 0.1 4 0 *** 
ICL -0.1 0 -1.1 0.3  
Residual standard error: 0.8589 on 840 degrees of freedom. 
Multiple R-squared: 0.6087. 
Adjusted R-squared: 0.5821. 
F-statistic: 22.92 on 57 and 840 DF, p-value: < 2.2e-16. 
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TABLE I.4: ICL–VALIDITY INTERACTIONS 
 Estimate Std. Err. t-value Pr(>|t|) Sig. 
(Intercept) 4.3 2.7 1.6 0.1  
ValidBTRUE 0.9 0.4 2.4 0 * 
HJT3212 -0.2 0.6 -0.4 0.7  
...      
lnAge -0.5 0.3 -1.6 0.1  
FYr_dec.L -2.5 0.3 -8.8 0 *** 
...      
ICC 0.2 0.1 4 0 *** 
ICLxValid -0.1 0.1 -2.2 0 * 
ICLxInvalid 0 0.1 0.3 0.8  
Residual standard error: 0.8574 on 839 degrees of freedom. 
Multiple R-squared: 0.6105. 
Adjusted R-squared: 0.5836. 
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